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THE RELIGION OF YESTERDAY AND TO-MORROW

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TO THE

THEOLOGICAL FACULTY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF LEIDEN

IN MEMORY OF
TEN HAPPY AND FRUITFUL YEARS, AND IN
GRATITUDE FOR A GREATLY PRIZED DEGREE

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PREFACE

THE following chapters represent lectures given in various churches in the United States in the course of the last five years. Part of them were also given in Oxford on the Hibbert Foundation, and some portions have appeared in *The Atlantic Monthly* and *The Hibbert Journal.*

Their purpose was to emphasize the extent to which Christianity has always been a movement and not a position. A religion is neither a fixed theology, nor an unvarying custom. It is the name given to a group of human beings regarded from a certain point of view. Continuity, not consistency, makes it one and the same, and continuity means neither invariable thought nor identical experience, but men's unbroken consent to live and work together. A religion soon dies when it loses the power to assimilate new truth, and to adapt itself to new circumstances.

Christianity has changed more than most religions, because it has had a higher and intenser vitality. It can be divided into several stages, markedly different from each other, yet each genuinely Christian, because the current of life—that is of membership—has passed on in unbroken, though not undisturbed, continuity.

During the early history of Christianity there was a period, which lasted for only a few years, when the disciples of Jesus were a purely Jewish body, which could have been fairly described as a Jewish sect. But this sect differed from all others in Judaism in that it reached a synthesis with Hellenism, first with its Greco-Oriental sacramentalism, and afterwards with its metaphysics. It was disowned by the Synagogue and became the Catholic Church, so that for more than fourteen hundred years Catholicism and the Christian religion are almost identical.[1]

A little later a great body of Christians broke away from what was traditional and became "Protestant." Between Catholicism and Protestantism there was a real difference, and Christianity split into two.

In the 19th century the causes which led to change again became intense; both on the Catholic and on the Protestant side tradition began to break down, and attempts were made to build up new forms of Christianity, which would keep what was best in that which was old, but should bring it into accord with truths accepted elsewhere as the basis of modern thought and modern science. None of these attempts has been completely successful, and the problem of

[1] They are not quite identical because there were several sects of Christianity—Montanism, Novatianism, etc.—which had long and important histories, though none ultimately survived. Moreover, in the 6th, 7th and 8th centuries we have the rise of Eastern National Churches—Nestorian and Monophysite in doctrine—which in some ways adopted the rise of the Western National Churches a thousand years later.

readjustment is of grave importance to those who wish to see Christianity live in the future, as it has in the past, by growth and change. It is the purpose of the present volume to discuss briefly the outstanding characteristics of Catholicism and Protestantism, and to indicate the main problems which must be solved by those who wish to build up a modern Christianity capable of becoming the religion of to-morrow.

In discussing this subject I have been obliged to devote much space to the theological controversy which is now raging in various forms on both sides of the Atlantic, but with more vehemence in the United States than in Europe. In describing it I have adopted the names Fundamentalist, Institutionalist and Experimentalist for the three real parties. Of these names Fundamentalist is well known in America, but scarcely used in England, though it is easy to understand. Institutionalist explains itself. For Experimentalist I might have said Modernist, but that word frequently includes Institutionalist, and I have preferred to coin a new name.

The outcome of the controversy will be of momentous importance, but in some ways it cannot be constructive. It is merely a clearing out of dead wood which has become diseased and dangerous. More really important, though there is less which can be said clearly about them, are the points raised in the last chapter.

Almost against my will I have been unable to

disguise my fear lest the churches leave their intellectual house-cleaning too late, so that the generation now growing up will turn its back on all organized forms of Christianity. The result of any such movement at first would be inevitably the apparent strengthening of a not unduly intelligent orthodoxy, and indeed this can be observed already. The secondary and lasting result would be, if I am not wholly mistaken, the gradual emergence of a new form of organized religion which probably would not call itself Christian, though it would represent all that is best in the Christianity of the educated theologian of to-day. I am daily more and more convinced that this may happen, but words cannot express my regret. One object of my writing is to prevent such a result, if it be possible, and to keep the name of Christian. I have few illusions as to the result of so writing; but at any rate *salvavi animam meam*. No one who has been brought up in the Christian church can fail to recognize how much will be lost if there be a breach in the continuity of religious history. The problem is how we can preserve the living spirit of religion, while refusing to be dominated by the theology of the past. It would be worth while to do almost anything to preserve the continuity of the churches. The one thing which it is not worth while to do is to sacrifice the freedom of the Experimentalist to the statesmanship of the Institutionalist. The Experimentalist has no more desire to go into the wilderness than other men, but, if it

must be, he is not afraid of what, after all, has often been the starting point of religion. But he does fear the attempt to make the safety of institutions more important than the principles for which they are founded, and regards it as a disastrous example of that policy which is willing *propter vitam vitai perdere causas.*

KIRSOPP LAKE.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

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I
YESTERDAY

I

CATHOLICISM

TO understand the real attraction of the Catholic system during the period when it was supreme, it is necessary to sympathise, if not to agree, with those who accept as true the commission of St. Peter: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church; and the gates of Hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." If we really believed that that commission was given to Peter by one who had power to give it, should we have any doubt as to its importance?

The meaning of this passage can hardly be doubted. It implies the existence of a supernatural society, founded at that moment by Jesus Christ, and handed over to the authority of Peter. Personally I do not believe in the existence of any such society, nor do I think that Jesus Christ used these words. That they refer to the Catholic Church I do not doubt, but experience refutes its claims to possess supernatural power. The moral indefectibility of the Church is as vain a fable as its intellectual infallibility,

though for more than a thousand years people believed in the literal truth of this passage, and their attitude of veneration for an infallible and indefectible institution was the logical consequence of their belief. Moreover history tells a different story of its origin.

The Catholic Church was not founded as an institution separate from Judaism, but was the result of a combination of Jewish with Greek and Oriental elements. In exact reversal of the prophecy of Zechariah, it was "Thy sons, O Zion, *with* thy sons, O Greece." From the sons of Zion was derived a belief in the Sovereignty of God. Taken at its best, all through its history, the Catholic Church stood for the characteristically Jewish belief that there is a sovereign Law of God which man neither made nor can unmake; that we can only interpret it, and never change it. That was the primary message of Israel to the world; it was extraordinarily important, and has been essentially corroborated as regards essentials by all that has since been learnt of the nature of life; for whatever else may have been modified by modern science, it only confirms the fact that the world is governed by Law, not by Desire. From Greek and Oriental sources came belief in a Divine Saviour[1] who was able and willing to give to those who trusted and believed in him a

[1] The Jewish expectations of the restoration of the Davidic kingdom under an "Anointed of the Lord," and of a supernatural Judge at the End of the Age, paved the way for this belief, and were imbedded in it; but the Catholic belief in a God-Saviour is Greco-Oriental rather than Jewish.

supernatural power of obtaining in a future life an immortality and happiness denied to the rest of the world. It was held that this Divine Saviour, who was identified with Jesus, had instituted certain sacraments through which alone men could obtain the gift of happy immortality. As to the future lot of the rest of the world there was some variation of opinion, but as a rule it was believed that those outside the ranks of Christianity were doomed to everlasting punishment in Hell, and all who thought that the Church had the power of deciding whether they would enjoy an immortality of bliss or suffer an immortality of pain naturally paid considerable attention to what the Church said. For that reason the Church had a power over the minds of men which was almost infinite, and, if its premises were accepted, wholly rational.

The general outline of these premises used to be so well known that it would scarcely need repeating, had it not been somewhat obscured by neglect in recent years. According to it man was created by God and placed in a garden where he was ordered not to eat the fruit of a certain tree—the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; but he disobeyed and fell into sin, and "through sin death came into the world." But the Church offers through its sacraments salvation from the consequence of this fall, by virtue of authority given to it by Jesus Christ, who is the incarnate Son of God.

Thus the essential character of the Catholic claim is that it is a supernatural society, with supernatural powers, conferring salvation and life on those who obey it: it alone has this universal power, and no other society can have it.

That is the oldest and central feature of Catholic Christianity. But other elements of enormous importance are present. It always accepted the burden not merely of offering salvation through sacraments, but of training and educating men and women to be worthy of this blessing. Nor did it stop there. It refused the offer of life to none, however wretched, poor or sinful; it gave them comfort, help, support, discipline and education, and led them by the hand along the narrow way which leads to life. Many other religions at that time were sacramental, and offered salvation and immortality. But they did so—to judge from the writings of Celsus—to the respectable and wealthy who could support and strengthen them: it was only Catholic Christianity which, amid the jeers of the heathen, sought out the failures of the world and offered them new life. Yet for this reason none survived, save only the Catholic Church; and for this reason, too, she lives yet, to command admiration for her life even from those who reject her thought and disbelieve her claims.

Into the triumphant Catholic Church of the Middle Ages another element entered which was scarcely present at the beginning. The Catholic Church in the West claimed to be, and to some extent really

was, the "Common Superior of Nations." This claim was partly the working out of Paul's conception of a Society in which there was "neither circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free"; partly a heritage from ancient Rome; partly the recognition of truths first clearly formulated by Augustine in his *City of God*. It brought the Church into the world of politics; for she offered to nations the spiritual and intellectual leadership which she already gave to individuals. Theology and Philosophy, Sacraments, Philanthropy and Political Leadership —these were the means whereby the Catholic Church dominated the world before the Reformation; and for all of them a supernatural sanction was claimed. The Church was built on the rock of Peter. It is still that tremendous verse which first meets the eye of the visitor to the Vatican, engraved in great letters over the front of the cathedral, "Tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram aedificabo ecclesiam meam."

Why did this great system break down in the sixteenth century? On the intellectual side, because during the two previous centuries it had refused to follow the progressive policy of its early days. It is, of course, true that in so doing it was false to the facts rather than to the theory of the past. In theory the Church was unchanged and unchangeable: but in practice it had changed rapidly. It is the recognition of this fact which characterizes all modern Protestant history of doctrine. According to the

Catholic theory Christian doctrine has never changed, either by alteration or by accretion. The Church merely develops the full meaning of truths which were always implicitly present. But according to modern Protestant theory there has been a constant change, sometimes slow, sometimes fast, both by alteration and by accretion. This is a new theory, but I believe that it is demonstrably right and the Catholic position demonstrably wrong. For the triumphant proof of this statement I must refer to such books as Loofs' *Dogmengeschichte*[1] or Harnack's *History of Doctrine*.[2] There are, of course, many details open to discussion, and neither Loofs nor Harnack would claim infallibility; but the theory of change and accretion gives to doctrine a rational and intelligible history which the theory of mere development from within quite fails to supply.

The details of the story as told by the modern school are complicated, but the main outline can be soon given. According to it, the Church was originally a body of Jews who had listened to the prophetic teaching of Jesus and regarded him as the "Messiah," who would come on the clouds of heaven to judge the living and dead and open the way into the Life of the World to Come. It had no sacraments which claimed to confer regeneration or immortality, though

[1] It is a great misfortune for English and American students that this great book has never been translated. It stands without a competitor in any language for sound knowledge, cautious statement and accurate reference to original sources.

[2] Translated in seven volumes by Neil Buchanan and others.

it probably had ceremonies which afterwards became sacraments.

By the beginning of the second century, and probably earlier, it accepted the form of thought and practice which was prevalent in Greco-Oriental circles, and it became sacramental. This does not mean that it borrowed consciously or directly from any one of the sacramental religions [1] of the period, but that it accepted a view of religion which was then almost universal. Time went on and it formed a further synthesis with Greek metaphysics; and neither the old nor the new elements remained unchanged. The Christian Church after the time of Origen is intellectually different from the Church of the Apostolic Fathers or of the Apologists. Yet another hundred years passed, and the Church changed its attitude to the State, and a little later came to terms with the ethics of Stoicism,[2] as it had already done with the metaphysics of Platonism.

Then came the Dark Ages, during which nothing was gained and much was lost; mysticism sank back into magic, and metaphysics degenerated into a new

[1] Called "Mystery" religions, because the ecclesiastical Greek for sacrament is *mysterion*. Formerly I have always used this phrase, but it is so open to misunderstanding and misrepresentation that in future I propose to drop the phrase "Mystery-religion," and say "sacramental religion." The only difference is that one word is Greek and the other is Latin.

[2] It had rejected the metaphysics of Stoicism, for, speaking generally, it may be said that the main stream of Christian metaphysics runs through Clement and Origen, who were Platonists, not through Tertullian, who was a Stoic. But the Stoic ethics finally triumphed, at least in the West, in Ambrose.

mythology in which philosophical terms,[1] reinforced by the worship of Saints and Angels, took the place of the Gods of Olympus. Nevertheless the darkness was never complete; when the light dawned, it brought with it the rediscovery of Aristotle's philosophy and logic.

This was the culminating point in the intellectual history of Christianity. Hitherto though there had been a period of serious retrogression, the Church had never been behind the van of thought, and if, instead of writing history from the point of view of achievement,[2] we were to write it as the story of races, we should find that the Church was always the leader. When we reach the twelfth century the real question was what the Church would do with Aristotle's logic. The great schoolmen endeavoured to accept it, and constructed a system in which Revelation and Logic were combined, on the assumption that both must be true. The *Summa* of St. Thomas Aquinas is the most glorious, if not the final, monument of this system. Revelation meant the Bible interpreted by the Church; Logic meant facts interpreted by the syllogism and all that it

[1] In Origen such words as God, Father, Son, Logos, Spirit, are philosophical terms used for the elucidation of Reality. In the popular Christianity of the Dark Ages they are the names of mythological persons.

[2] From the point of view of achievement the Dark Ages are a reality: intellectual life was lower in the seventh century than in the fourth, if we compare the leaders of the Church or of the Empire. But if we follow the history of our own race there is no period of retrogression, but only the slow education of the Germanic peoples by the Church.

entails. The one thing to which Logic was not applied as a test of truth was Revelation, for though Revelation is not illogical it is supralogical.

And on this rock Scholasticism was wrecked. It postulated, not proved, the infallibility of Scripture or of Revelation. It may be said that Logic also deals in posulates, but the difference is that while Logic postulates that experience is true, and is confirmed in this postulate by observation, Revelation has to postulate that research is wrong and is contradicted by observation. Revelation and logic could not be reconciled, and the Church chose Revelation.

The crucial moment came when astronomers presented the thesis that observation showed that the universe is different from what Revelation supposed. The whole intellectual theory of the Church had been based on a view of the universe which included the Ptolemaic theory of astronomy. According to this the earth is in the middle, and round the earth are a number of spheres; the sun belongs to one sphere; the moon belongs to another, each of the planets to another, and the fixed stars to yet another. Thus there were supposed to be a series of transparent, concentric spheres, which revolved at varying paces round each other and round the earth, which was in the middle. In that way the motions of the stars were explained. It was an excellent theory based on the assumption that the earth is the centre of the universe, as it undoubtedly appears to be.

Copernicus, however, perceived that the sun, not the earth, is the centre, and that the earth goes round the sun, not the sun round the earth. Nevertheless, the opposite view is biblical and seems to have the weight of Revelation in its favour. The Church, therefore, held that, if the writers of the Bible stated that the sun goes round the earth, it must do so. It had been "revealed" that it was so, and since it was impossible to correct theology in accordance with astronomical observation, the observation must be wrong. Galileo, the disciple of Copernicus, was condemned as a heretic. He saved himself by withdrawing his opinion, though he was not convinced, for at the moment he stood almost alone. Popular opinion, ecclesiastical opinion, biblical evidence, were all on the side of the Church. Only the facts were on the side of Galileo; they are valuable allies, but often render only posthumous assistance, and Galileo preferred to survive. His original opinion, however, supported by facts, won after his death. Even the Catholic Church has now long ago found some way of recognising the astronomical theories of Copernicus. But it has never abandoned the principles for which it stood in the time of Galileo. The price it has paid is that it has never again led intellectual progress in the gradual discovery of the facts about the universe, which has been going on continuously ever since. "Revelation" and Discovery have been separated more and more widely from each other. The years have gone by, and have

rolled into centuries; the gulf between the teaching of the Church and what is known to be true by the evidence of observation has grown greater and greater.

A form of thought which shuts the door against truth cannot escape death: for the defect in Catholic theology is not that it is not true. It goes deeper. The whole truth is outside our ken; we all err on many points. This we cannot help. But we can help leaving out of our consideration truth which is within our sight. There is no discredit in the fallibility of human nature or in the probability of error. What is not only discreditable, but fatal, is neglect of truth that is seen. We cannot help being frequently wrong, but we can help persevering in error which can be seen. The man or society that is unwilling to learn, that conceals or avoids the confession of mistake by verbal subtleties, that claims infallibility and indefectibility in the face of obvious error, is permanently incapable of holding the intellectual leadership of the world.

The indictment, therefore, on the intellectual side against the Catholic Church is that it refused, does refuse, and now forever must refuse all truth which demands that it recognise its past errors. So far as the Reformation was an intellectual movement and embodied the revolt of the New Learning, it was the first sign that the intelligence of the world was on the side of Observation and Discovery, rather than of Authority and Revelation.

Politically the Catholic Church broke down because it had basely exploited its organisation. The only justification for an organisation which is above nations is that it should be used impartially in the interest of all the nations. Otherwise it is merely a larger influence, possibly for good but probably for evil, than a single nation. To justify itself it must be something which works, not for any one nation or for any alliance of nations, but for each and for all. Theoretically the Catholic Church was well aware of this and the best men in it tried to live up to the responsibilities involved, but it failed because, in the end, its enormous opportunity was exploited in their own interests by Italian princes, German electors, and Spanish kings. The Church suffered because, having that which was good, it used it for wrong purposes. The Reformation was the recognition of this failure, though on this point it was not really a reformation at all, but a disastrous step backwards; it paved the way for that exaltation of nationality which has gone far to ruin our civilization, and it destroyed instead of developing the claim of Christianity to provide the "common superior" and the sympathetic critic which nations need if they are permanently to coöperate for their common good.

Finally, the Church failed spiritually because it exploited its sacraments for human power, and did not use them for the good of men and women. The indictment against it is not that its sacramental

theory was wrong. No doubt it was, for immortality cannot be conferred by sacraments, and baptised human nature is not really regenerate or different from unbaptised. But ignorance is not sin, and the Church could not escape its ignorance; yet it could have escaped using its theory, right or wrong, in the interests, not of the poor men and women, who came in innocence and ignorance for help and comfort, but of priests, officials and kings, allowing them to exploit selfishly that enormous power, which they had over the minds of men, to further their own advancement and to strengthen the society to which they belonged. This was the final cause and justification of the Reformation.

Therefore, the Catholic Church failed in the sixteenth century because the men who governed it were unfaithful to the responsibilities put upon them. They were untrue to the claim of the intellect, which is not that men should achieve impossible learning, but that they should always be willing to admit ignorance and to accept instruction. They were untrue to the claim of religious life, which is that the man who is in the position of adviser, or teacher, should advise and should teach, in accordance with what he can see of right and wrong, in the interest of the spiritual and moral lives of his flock, whether men or nations, and not for the sake of the power which he has over their actions.

II

PROTESTANTISM

THE collapse of the Church in the 16th century brought about the Reformation; the reaction against the evils of a corrupt Catholicism rent Christianity in two, and the name Protestant was given to the part which broke away from the parent body.

Protestantism was a moral, intellectual, and political movement; but its real strength was moral and enabled it to achieve intellectual and political results which would otherwise have been impossible. The failure of Rome, which was so much more a failure of men than of a system, gradually produced a fiery impatience and white heat of indignation which swept through Northern Europe. The very name of "priest" became an object of hatred, and in recoil from the deceit and ignorance of the Roman clergy, men rushed with enthusiasm to learn truth for themselves. Small nations such as the Dutch, and little cities such as Leiden, put themselves at the head of civilization, and proved once more that greatness is not to be measured by population, or achievement by miles of territory. Suddenly what at first had been mere dissatisfaction with Rome

became rebellion; rebellion became permanent separation; and in the course of a single generation a new and vigorous Christianity was established and organised.

Two permanent contributions were made by Protestantism to Christianity, and point the way to the religion of to-morrow.

The Reformers abolished utterly any belief in the infallibility of ecclesiastical authority in interpretation. They retained the Catholic belief in the infallibility of Scripture but not in that of the Church. Events had indeed proved somewhat too strongly that the Church could err, but the question of the Bible had not yet presented itself. The Bible was infallible, and the belief in Revelation was unchanged, but it was its own interpreter, or rather every Christian man had the right to interpret it for himself. This sounds absurd, as though a multitude of interpretations were possible. But what it really means is that a long step was taken toward the supremacy of logic and reason in the interpretation of Scripture. The Reformers—Calvin is, of course, the most important on this issue—did not reach the point of saying that Facts and Reason are the only things which have infallible authority, but they would have accepted the statement if a clause saving the claims of Biblical Revelation had been added. The way was paved to the position reached in the nineteenth century, when the application of Reason and Facts showed that it

was impossible to interpret the Bible consistently with them and yet preserve the belief that it is infallible Revelation. For the moment, at least, the Protestant Church was the intellectual leader of humanity.

Equally important was the emphasis laid on Justification by Faith as opposed to Sacramental Grace. This doctrine is inextricably bound up with many difficult and doubtful questions of interpretation, especially those found in the Epistle to the Romans. But stripped of these theological difficulties, its psychological and spiritual strength is that it insists that man can bring his life to a higher level, not by the magic of sacraments, but by an attitude of will on his own part which binds him to all that is noble in life, and sets him free from what is base.[1]

Life is a constant struggle against Evil; we cannot explain its origin, and most of us would shrink from defining its nature; but we know what it is by experience. It appears in the world mainly in three forms: crime, vice, and sin. They are not identical and cannot be met in the same way.

Crime is a breach of the laws ratified by legal authority. It is sometimes the result of vice and sin, sometimes of bad laws.[2] The antidote to crime is good legislation properly enforced.

[1] I do not mean that Luther or Calvin would have accepted this statement as adequate, for it leaves out, what to them was central, the acceptance of Jesus Christ as Saviour and the "prevenient" grace of God.

[2] If the laws are sufficiently bad it may even become a duty to commit

Vice is conduct which is harmful. It does not depend on what we think or on the rules laid down by others, but on fact. It is possible to be vicious quite unconsciously and with the best intentions. The antidote is education, for normal men will not do what is harmful when they know that it is so.

Sin is a perversion of the human will which makes men wish to do evil rather than good. Neither legislation nor education will cure sin; it can be dealt with only by the power of that spiritual regeneration which comes when men dedicate themselves to the service of good; and that dedication can come only by the effort of each individual man. Each can do it for himself; he cannot do it for any one else; and none can do it for him. This effort of the individual and the success which it meets are essential features of Luther's Justification by Faith, for it is not an attempt to "do right," to live in accordance with a code of conduct, but to "be right," to become capable of right action.

Thus, the escape from the intellectual tyranny of Catholic theology—even though it was but a partial escape—and the renewed emphasis on the Will which sets itself aright—Justification by Faith—these were the permanent contributions of Protestantism to the religious world.

a crime. When, for instance, men are ordered by law to do what their conscience forbids, they ought to break the law. But they become criminals in so doing, though not sinners. It should never be forgotten that directly laws make into crimes what conscience does not make into sins, they lose effectiveness—for the ultimate validity of law depends on Conscience.

They were great achievements; but they were offset from the beginning by grave defects, so that though Protestantism made real contributions to progress it did not and cannot take the place of Catholicism. The Catholic Church has remained an incomparable force in the world of religion and of politics, for whatever were its faults before the Reformation, it had also certain great virtues and performed functions which are not performed by Protestantism and only very slowly are being taken over by other bodies.

This is especially true of three points. Protestantism has not supplied the need of a supra-national society; it has not supplied the need of sacraments; and it has not supplied the need of personal care for the spiritually sick. Catholicism in theory, and partly in practice, has supplied all three, though there are signs that two of the three are now being met, and met better, by other agencies.

Protestantism has not supplied the need of a supra-national society. Its curse has always been nationalism. When the English, Dutch, German and other North-European nations broke away from the Catholic Church, they adopted the principle that each nation had independent sovereignty in ecclesiastical as well as secular matters. An end was made of any theory of a power above nations. This was not progress: it was retrogression, and a practical denial of the truth which Rome, whether Imperial or Holy, had always maintained, for in theory, if

not in practice, the rule of Rome meant the general good of all. Nor as time has gone on has there been any serious effort in Protestantism to remedy its defect; on the contrary, the general trend has been toward further disruption and greater loss of power. It soon became evident that a national Church was open to exploitation by the government of the country; the tyranny of the court proved as evil as the tyranny of the Vatican, and the hand of Protestant Ecclesiastics was as heavy as that of Papal Legates. Thus there arose a movement for "free" churches; free, that is to say, from any organic connection with nations. In this way some evils were certainly abolished, but the price was considerable. The very numerous Protestant denominations which arose, especially in America, were all sub-national, instead of being supra-national, like the Catholic Church, or national, like the Church of England.

To achieve a system which shall be supra-national has been the vision seen by the noblest minds for two thousand years. Augustus and his followers thought of a political system, to which religion should be subordinate; Leo the Great, Gregory VII, and Innocent III thought of, and nearly achieved, an ecclesiastical system, to which politics should be subordinate; it sometimes seems as if our generation, after a war which was the *reductio ad sanguinem* of nationalism, is going to attempt an industrial system, to which both politics and religion will be subordinate, surpassing all nations in size and power. It may suc-

ceed even though it may not at once unify civilization. Industry and Finance are the only really supra-national powers to-day—but the ideal of the Popes appeals to me as the higher. History rarely repeats its offer to those who once refuse it, but it is still possible that the vision seen by the Catholic Church, and the opportunity which it missed because of human fallibility and wickedness, may be seen again and followed to a triumphant end.

Still, whatever agency may succeed in the end in unifying humanity on a plane higher than nationality, it will do so by making men see that there is really something higher, with different values, and with a different authority, and men will obey it because, having seen, they cannot but obey. It will be the vision, not the politics, of Leo or of Hildebrand, which will conquer. It is a very splendid vision, and they saw it very clearly, but it is older than they, for it was expressed once and for all by St. Paul. Christians who forget this have forgotten the "first thing," and unbelievers who have learnt it are carrying the cross though they may not bear the name.

Just as Protestantism has failed to supply the need of a supra-national society, so it has also failed to supply adequately the need of Sacraments, which are a permanent element in Catholicism which Protestants have never been able fully to assimilate. Regarded from the outside, the sacraments of the Catholic Church appear to be magical performances in which we moderns have neither part nor lot.

They merely pander to the superstitions of the populace. That is half true; but the other half is that all through life, those who have eyes to see are constantly discovering the existence of another world of reality underneath the multiplicity and diversity of our actions, our sufferings, and our emotions. Again and again our actions and the happenings of our lives have an importance only in so far as they are connected with that hidden, unseen, real world. Men and women know that it is impossible, in any description of what has happened to them, to give the real value of the events of their lives. To record that some experience was excessively happy or remarkably tragic may be an adequate description to the outside world, but to the man himself it was a revelation of unknown depths, making the happenings of life seem to be the outward, visible sign of an inward spiritual grace.

The Catholic sacramental system is in part an imperfect attempt to realize that side of life. The mistake which so many Protestants make is in thinking that, because they can see the mythical element of the Mass, or of the sacramental system in general, they can achieve truth merely by cutting those things out; whereas the error in the Catholic system is not in claiming a sacramental value for the Mass, but in denying the possibility of that same value to all the events of life. The Protestant who rejects the Catholic Mass and puts nothing in its place has lost rather than gained. The

Protestant who rejects the Catholic Mass because he cannot accept the myth which it embodies but finds in all life true sacraments has learned the lesson of Catholicism: and such a man is not often eager to speak unmixed evil of the Catholic Mass, even though he rejects the Catholic theory of its history and value, because he realises that it is not so much wrong as an imperfect and limited appreciation of a truth which he has come to find, on a wider scale, throughout life. The theory of the Mass is indeed wrong—for the educated, perversely wrong—but in Italy or France, not so much among the educated and learned as among the peasants, that Mass, which is to us a superstitious ceremony, is an insight into the mystical value of life, lit up by the splendour of divine grace. Those who can see that divine grace can appreciate the significance of the Catholic Mass even when they find its power limited and broken by superstition.

A third point at which Protestantism has failed, as compared with the Catholic Church, is that it has not adequately supplied the need of personal care for the spiritually sick. In Catholicism the confessional heretofore always has been part of its strength, because the confessional, like the Mass, is the wrong way of doing the right thing. The priest in the confessional presents himself to us who are outside as merely the descendant of the magician who is making a wholly impossible claim to forgive or not to forgive sins, and we say truly that experience

proves that his claim is wrong. That is so, but nevertheless there are two groups to which the priest gives the help of trained knowledge when it is needed; and this help is not efficiently given in Protestant churches.

The first group is those who feel spiritually ill, unhappy, and miserable. That is not a healthy condition. It is a sign of ill-health to feel physical pain and discomfort, and the same is true of the soul. Happiness goes with health. For those who can do their work, and are doing it as well as they can, soul and body look tolerably well after themselves and are happy. Still, in case of illness, especially when the cause is obscure, it is well to consult a doctor—and there is sickness of the soul as well as of the body. The Catholic Church has provided in the priest in the confessional an expert who will look after the soul and give good advice about it just as the doctor will about the body. The fact that the priest does not know as much about the soul as he ought, does not alter the fact that the Church is attempting the right thing, though it may be doing it in the wrong way. In fact it is doing it in the wrong way; for it attempts to claim supernatural power, instead of merely stating the laws of life and applying them. It provides medicine; but it mixes it up with magic. For this reason the strength of the Catholic Church in this direction is gradually failing because it is being surpassed in actual knowledge by psychopathic doctors, whose methods are often very like those of

the confessional, but are founded on better knowledge, and are free from the taint of magic.

Another group which has often benefited by the confessional contains those who really do not know what they ought to do and doubt where the line comes between right and wrong. In modern life it is sometimes impossible not to doubt what may lawfully be done, and, under those circumstances, the wisest thing to do is to consult the man who knows the law. But often the question is more complex; there is moral doubt what is right rather than—often a very different thing—what is lawful, or what is not. To whom should men go? The Catholic goes to his priest. Very often, especially in the poorer classes of society, the priest gives extremely good advice which scarcely could be otherwise obtained; this always has been so all through the centuries, and is part of the enduring strength of the Catholic Church. It is true that the priests have again and again exploited that power in their own interests, especially when dealing with the rich, but they have not done so always, and it has never been impossible among Catholics for the poor to consult a man who has made himself an expert to the best of his ability in distinguishing between right and wrong in the changing circumstances of life.

In these two ways Catholicism has in the confessional a real advantage over other forms of Christianity; for it has not proved possible for Protestants to keep and to develop intelligently those two sides

of the confessional. But even Catholicism has not been wholly successful, and it is interesting to notice how there is a change coming into the relation of the other professions to the Priesthood. Other men are taking up the burden which the priest has failed adequately to carry. The pendulum is swinging back. In the Middle Ages the priest was the lawyer, and he was also the doctor, for practically all learned professions were concentrated into the hands of the priests. Now the ministry of the Church is losing function after function and other professions are taking hold of them.

At present if a man is really spiritually sick, where does he go? More often to a psychopathic doctor, especially if he be a Protestant; and I venture to say that he is right because the modern doctor is beginning to take up the functions of the priests, and to do the work which they used to do in the Middle Ages. He does so in terms of a different view of life, of a different theology, and in the light of increased knowledge as to the psychology—the spiritual nature—of man.

Similarly, with another group. To-day when a man wants to know what is right, more and more he consults a lawyer. I am aware that some lawyers are regarded by their clients or by themselves chiefly as men who can tell you how close you can go to illegality without actually committing it. But there are others who really are able and willing to give expert advice to their clients—if they wish to

know—as to what is right, as well as what is legal, so that they are becoming experts in the casuistry of modern life, just as the priests were in the Middle Ages.

Finally a weakness which has no analogy in Catholicism, has developed recently with alarming rapidity in some Protestant churches. It is a tendency to make the congregation the ultimate court of appeal. This is held to be in accordance with the spirit of democracy; but, though no doubt the will of the people is the best method of making certain that they shall have the political leaders whom they deserve, it has its limitations in the ecclesiastical world. It produces a type of "echoing" Christianity, in which the pulpit gives back in loud tones the whispers which it has heard from the pews.

Partly, perhaps, from a perception—sometimes unconscious—of these evils, Protestantism in England and America has been marked in recent years by the growth of "Anglo-Catholicism" of which the real strength is spiritual, not intellectual. It is the heir of the Oxford Movement in the first half of the nineteenth century, which was itself due to the conviction that on some points Protestantism could ill endure comparison with the Catholic Church. Newman, Pusey, Keble, and the other leaders of the Movement, saw the weakness of Protestant theology, and tried to revive forms of thought and worship which, as nearly as the law of the land allowed, should

reproduce the golden age of Catholicism, but without accepting the Catholic polity. Newman soon saw the inherent lack of logic in this position, and submitted to the Church of Rome, but comparatively few followed him. In the half century, roughly speaking, following Newman's submission, the tendency to imitate Rome in thought and practice grew rapidly; but actual submission, though by no means unknown, was relatively rare. Indeed, it may fairly be said that those who seemed to be in fact nearest to Rome were often the most vociferous in proclaiming their independence, justifying themselves in their own eyes, though becoming ridiculous to all others, by speaking of the Roman Church as the "Italian Mission." Nevertheless, this movement was a true appreciation of much which Protestantism had failed to grasp, and ever since the Oxford Movement many of the most active minds in the Church of England and in the Protestant Episcopal Church of America have felt the spiritual appeal of the Catholic system. It has had two results: first, an attempt to claim that those who do this *are* Catholic; secondly, an attempt to go back to the system of theology, and, so far as possible, to the rites and ceremonies of the Catholic Church. The first result is superficially illogical. But there is no valid reason for denying the name of Catholic to those who desire it, if it be recognized that it has changed its meaning, inasmuch as names are that which we wish to be called, and to a generation which knows no Greek there is nothing absurd in the

arrogation of the Greek word for "Universal" by societies which are local in polity, divergent in thought, and discordant in custom. Obviously, however, neither the Church of England, nor the Protestant Episcopal Church of America is the Catholic Church, though their members may hold many of the views current in it. One is a national, the other a sub-national, church. No one outside these communions looks on them as Catholics, least of all do Catholics. But this superficial illogicality is, after all, not very important. The second result is more significant. It implies a recognition of the value of the system of discipline and of sacraments found in the Catholic Church. Thus it has come to pass that in the Church of England and cognate bodies, Protestant though they are in polity, there is a survival of sacramental doctrine, and even more of sacramental sentiment, which separates them from other Protestant bodies, and is a point of true similarity with Catholicism. It is, I think, because they have this sacramental side that the "Anglican" communions are apparently suffering somewhat less than other Protestant Churches from the intellectual storm which has burst upon Christianity during the last hundred years, though they have by no means escaped.

III

THE THEOLOGICAL STORM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

SINCE the Reformation, there has been no intellectual movement in Christianity which can compare in importance with the storm which began in the first half of the nineteenth century, and is still unabated. It has produced a general unsettlement of mind with regard to all traditional doctrine, because it has broken up the authority of the Revelation on which doctrine is based. That Revelation gave a complete account of man's history and future lot, beginning in the Garden of Eden and ending in Heaven or Hell, and this account has become completely discredited at every point where it can be reached.

It has broken down, perhaps, most completely under pressure from the enhanced sense of justice gained in the nineteenth century. It has become incredible that God would treat men in a way which even we would think unfair and horrible. We are tolerably certain that none of us, either ourselves or our friends, is quite good enough for Heaven, and we have a similar belief that none of us, not even our worst enemy, is quite bad enough for Hell. We

certainly think that the dividing line between people cannot be drawn with that clear and somewhat ferocious emphasis. The truth rather is that when we begin to depart out of the realm of feeling into that of reason we see how we are all of us so strangely mixed that in our best moments we desire nothing more than a process of elimination in the nature of everyone. Each of us knows that we would be glad to be freed from some elements which do not deserve perpetuation or life, and we think, except in our deepest moments of depression, that there is probably something in us, not without its use, which may be justifiably allowed to continue and does deserve life. It is not a decision between this man and that, but between two parts of one. For this reason men steadily reject the obvious meaning of Revelation. Ecclesiastical theologians have done their best to explain Scripture in some other way, but its language, both as to Heaven and Hell, is somewhat too explicit to be easily manipulated.

To the enhanced sense of justice has been added the testimony of Astronomy, Geology, and Biology, which have combined to teach a doctrine of the origin and nature of man wholly different from that given by Revelation in the Bible. A moral sense of justice has thrown doubt on Hell, and the scientific exposition of evolution has rendered the Garden of Eden questionable.

Finally, the study of history has thrown a bright light on the true nature of the Bible. It has made it

plain that the Old Testament is not an infallible Revelation. As an historical record it is far from infallible, and its account of the origin of the world and of man is a Semitic myth. But it is also the very instructive record of the evolution of Israel from the condition of a nomad Semitic tribe to a settled commercial people with a genius for morality and religion. It illustrates the growth both of morality and of religion, and shows how man makes God in his own image, though not, indeed, in the image of man as he actually is, but as he would fain be. Viewed in this way the Bible has enormous value for education, religion, and literature, which no other book can replace, but it gives the story of Discovery, not of Revelation in any sense in which the word has been or can be properly used, for Discovery and Revelation are not the same thing.

Such was the contribution of the nineteenth century to our knowledge of the Old Testament. It is not strange that it raised a storm. The matter was fought out with great vigour and not a little bitterness, but the view stated above seems to have triumphed absolutely. Though some professors of the Old Testament seem scarcely to see, or to be willing to see, the importance of their own teaching, and would claim to use the word Revelation of the narratives which they dissect and correct, the majority would agree with the preceding paragraph.

At the end of the nineteenth century scholars turned to the New Testament, and showed that it in no wise

differed essentially from the Old. Moreover, it became increasingly clear from the study of Church History that the chronological order is Old Testament, Christian Church, New Testament. The early Christians wrote the New Testament, and based most of their teaching on a view of the Old Testament and an interpretation of its meaning which scholarship cannot support. Nor was this all: the picture of the Christ of the Catholic Church and of orthodox Protestantism disappeared, and a different picture of the Jesus of history began to be visible. Naturally dispute and controversy ensued.

The whole edifice of Christian Theology began to collapse. The Bible had been the source of knowledge about God and Christ, and the basis of authority for the Catholic Church. It had proved on examination not to be infallible and slowly the problem began to define itself to the religious leaders of the day:—how far is the Christian Religion necessarily bound up with the Christian Theology? Must we keep the Theology to sustain the Church or must we not rather change the Theology if we wish to keep the Religion? It is at least clear that men will not long be willing or able to have one "view of the Universe" for ordinary purposes, and another for the exploitation of Religion. If the Biblical account be true, it must be true for the astronomer and biologist as well as for the preacher. If the astronomical and biological account be true, it must be used in the pulpit as well as in the lecture-room.

By the middle of the nineteenth century this storm already began to be felt, and, naturally, more than one way of meeting its force was devised. In England two clearly distinguishable lines of reconstruction were attempted to meet its onslaught. This was the result of the previous tendency, already noted, which had produced a party within the Church in favour of "Catholic" thought and practice. Both this party and those who had remained more strictly Protestant—Evangelicals, as they were often called—felt the effect of Biblical criticism and of Natural Science, but dealt with it in somewhat differing ways.

From the Evangelicals, who had been dominant in England at the beginning of the nineteenth century, arose the Broad Church party with Maurice, Arnold, Kingsley, Stanley, and a little later Westcott,[1] as its leaders. These were all, though in different measure, philosophers and mystics. They belong to the great tradition which can be traced back through the Cambridge Platonists, the Mystics of the Middle Ages, St. Augustine, Origen, and St. John, and still further through Ammonius Saccas[2] and his prede-

[1] I do not think that Lightfoot and Hort should be included in this list. They seem to me to have been pure historians. But I am not sure whether this is right: especially am I doubtful as to Hort. I have sometimes thought that he suppressed the mysticism which Westcott tried to make articulate.

[2] The main line of succession divides with Ammonius Saccas. Both Origen and Plotinus were his pupils, but the line of Plotinus, though a purer mysticism than Origen's, failed. His true successor is, in a sense, Augustine rather than Porphyry. In the same way a generation earlier, Philo's synthesis of Platonism and Judaism failed to produce a direct successor and is represented by Christian rather than by Jewish

cessors to Plato and unknown mystics whose names have been forgotten. To those who belong to this tradition the world in which we live is surrounded and permeated by another, above time and space, in which values rather than events are real. This world is, as it were, constantly making itself felt, yet ever evading our complete perception. There is a wall of partition between us and it, but in that wall there are doors and windows. In the course of history man has used, valued, and ornamented some of these doors and windows. The Christian Church is a notable example, and for many generations its sacraments and services have been windows in the wall of partition. Yet the light is more than the windows, and those who are stewards of the light must not degrade themselves into being merely watchmen of the window. To emphasise this seems to me to have been the essential contribution of the Broad Churchmen. They knew that the Church is a window, not the light, and that the window needed to be altered that the light might shine through it.

Nevertheless they were afraid of destroying what they wished to reform, and, in the agonising effort to build up and not destroy, they—especially Westcott—went further than was logically justifiable.

There is in the Abbey of Mont St. Michel a room which, if one stand at the entrance, seems to have

writers. Our intellectual children are not always those of our body, nor our spiritual children those of our intellect; adoption is greater than generation, and the soul unites what the intellect divides.

only one small window; it is full of light, and it seems wonderful that such a flood of brilliance should pour in through one little opening. Move on into the room and you will see that the whole wall is pierced with many windows, and through them, invisible as they were at first, the light is pouring in. The Broad Church party was somewhat in the position of one who should insist that after all the light is all coming in by the window that was first seen. It is the same light, and therefore it is the same window. The result was the "Westcottian" theology, in which a deep and true mysticism is combined with an amazingly artificial construction of doctrine; and the skill of the writer is so great that the reader often fails to perceive that he is gradually led to admit that the words of the historic theology somehow mean exactly what they were originally intended to deny. It is correct in recognising that the light of religion is unchanged, but not in maintaining that the window is the same as in the past.

But in the eighties and nineties a new school arose. The younger adherents of the Oxford Movement began to see that the old theology was insufficient, just as the school of Maurice, Kingsley, and Westcott, was based on the same recognition by the heirs of evangelical piety. It was no longer possible to assert that the Old Testament was the infallible word of God, when Robertson Smith in Cambridge, Cheyne and Driver in Oxford, Kuenen and Wellhausen on the continent, had shown so clearly that

large portions of it were Semitic myths, and that many statements were inaccurate. Forgetting the fate of Marcion, this school endeavoured to accept the results but to minimise the importance of the criticism of the Old Testament. It was, after all, a Jewish book, not a Christian one; the New Testament was unaffected, and, in any case, the Church, not the Bible, was the source of inspiration and infallibility.

As a system of doctrine this position was inadequate. It had all the defects of the Westcottian theology, from which indeed it had probably learnt. It never persuaded theologians of the older generation, such as Canon Liddon, who thought that it spelt ruin for the intellectual fabric of the Oxford Movement. But when stated in *Lux Mundi*[1] it was enormously successful with the younger men at Oxford in the nineties. Charles Gore and his immediate successor at the Pusey House were the spiritual centre of the University.

On looking back it seems that this result was due to a curiously happy combination of circumstances. First, and far the most important of all, those of us who were then undergraduates and frequented the Pusey House, realised that there was something of the prophetic spirit in this group, which distinguished them from other men. In the second place, we were fascinated by the apparently triumphant use of Old Testament criticism and the philosophy of T. H.

[1] A volume of essays published in 1890, by several Oxford Tutors, edited by Charles Gore, afterwards Bishop of Oxford.

Green to support an intelligible theology. Finally, who, at that time, could resist the enthusiasm and inspiration of John Carter, or doubt that the social problems of the world could be solved through the Christian Social Union by the teaching of the New Testament and the principles of the Fabian Society ? [1]

In the thirty years which have gone by so quickly since those days, few of us have retained all the beliefs and enthusiasms of youth. It was only a few years later that I came to see that the mythical element in the Old Testament affects the whole fabric of Catholic theology. The experience of religion, not its intellectual expression, ought to be the basis of the Church ; and its theology—which is " intellectual expression "—must be put into language consistent with our present knowledge of the universe rather than reminiscent of the thought of the past. Religion may be inspired, but theology certainly is not.

Nevertheless, though I have moved far away from the thoughts of the Pusey House of the nineties, I know that some of the men whom I then met belonged to the " communion of saints," and though I have come to reject much of their teaching, I shall always continue to revere the example of their lives. The

[1] I certainly could not resist it. For me the Church was a society partly of mystics, partly of social reformers. Even before I had graduated, I had written a book (still unpublished !) but it was not on theology (for which I cared little) ; it was a history of the London Dock-Strike. The spiritual atmosphere of those days was all very delightful, though it was intellectually not very sound.

Anglo-Catholic party of to-day is the product of the writers of *Lux Mundi*, much as the Ritualists of the seventies and eighties were the product of the writers of *Tracts for the Times*. Just as the Ritualists stood for Catholicism without Rome, so Anglo-Catholicism seems to stand for Catholicism without the Bible. It attempts to preserve the Catholic theology while abandoning its basis; but the intellectual weakness of the position is covered by the religious intensity and spiritual power of its supporters.

The development of events in America, which is less well known to me, seems to have been similar to that in England. The storm was felt, and towards the end of the nineteenth century there were not a few trials for heresy in various churches. In general, however, as in England, the "critical" party won. In colleges, and even in many theological seminaries, it was thought that the old theology had received a mortal blow. But a strenuous effort was made to render the change imperceptible, if not acceptable, to the older and more conservative generation by using all the old terminology in a new sense, and solving theological difficulties by ignoring them. To judge from the ignorance displayed by college students who present themselves at theological schools as candidates for the ministry of various Protestant denominations, there has been, for at least a generation, an almost complete lack of instruction in the elements of theology or Bible history. It is unusual to find any man who comes from liberal circles with

even that elementary knowledge of the Bible which used to be given in every Sunday School and in most homes.

This is not because the Bible has been dropped. It is because, instead of interpreting it in order to show what the writers meant, it is used as a vehicle to convey what the preacher wishes. Instead of being explained in the light of knowledge of the time when it was written, it is made to refer to the problems of to-day. The preachers have lost their fathers' belief in the infallibility of Scripture, but they endeavour to transfer something of the traditional authority of the Bible to teaching which they appear to take from it, but have really inserted into it by homiletical conjuring. Thus, for instance, they have read into it Science, not always with complete accuracy, and explained that in some mysterious way when the Bible said Creation it meant Evolution, when it said Fall it meant Ascent, and when it said Salvation it meant Progress.

IV

THE REAL DIVISIONS IN MODERN PROTESTANTISM

THE immediate results of any great intellectual revolution are inevitably controversy on secondary points, and movements which prove ultimately to have had little importance. This is obviously true of the revolution just described which has so profoundly affected all branches of Protestantism. But some of the permanent results of fifty years of rapid change are now making themselves visible and indicate the forces which will determine the form which religion will assume tomorrow.

In the first place it is obvious that the old denominational lines have lost all intellectual meaning. In many cases the controversies which called the existing churches into being have been forgotten, and their sectarian existence depends on little differences of ritual or twists of phraseology to which importance is attached, though the reason which produced them has been forgotten. This is especially true in America; I think that in the course of conversation I could almost always tell the difference between Unitarians, Universalists, Congregationalists, Epis-

copal Methodists, Baptists, or members of the Protestant Episcopal Church. I should do so only by listening for " blessed words " which I have learnt to recognise. A question, for instance, on the doctrine of the Trinity will be answered in one way by a Trinitarian, in other by a Unitarian, but only rarely will either be able to give an intelligent statement of its real meaning or of its actual formulation by the theologians of the past. Athanasius would undoubtedly have excommunicated all of them.

One of the immediate results is a movement toward reunion. This is partly due to economic reasons. When two denominations have forgotten why they ever separated, and neither can afford to pay a living wage to a minister, they often remember how good it is for brethren to dwell together in unity.

But it is a mistake to suppose that this is the chief reason. There is a more creditable desire in the minds of almost all Protestant leaders, who understand that the cause common to them all is injured by every unnecessary division. Some of those who stand highest in the Anglican communions even dream of a reunion between themselves and the Catholic Church. Unfortunately the terms on which reunion is possible are quite well known, and can hardly be changed. These terms are the acceptance of the Catholic polity and the Catholic theology. If the Anglicans were willing to accept both, the Roman authorities would almost certainly look with sympathy on the suggestion of dealing with Anglican customs

and observances as liberally as they deal with those of the Uniate Churches. But unfortunately, though there are some who, like myself, admire the general theory of the Catholic polity, and many others who accept almost all the Catholic Theology, few accept both. For most Protestants there can be no reunion with any Church which makes authority a surrogate for truth. No one would say that the Vatican of to-day consciously adopts this position. But it does so unconsciously and automatically. To the Protestant adherence to truth means a willingness to learn, to confess ignorance and error, to accept new facts, and to follow the light; to a Catholic it means the acceptance of the unchangeable opinion of the Church speaking with the voice of God. Between these there can be no compromise and no peace. Those who can accept the Catholic position seem to have but little reason for refraining from joining the Church of Rome except that they are unwilling to submit to the methods of Roman administration. I wish from my heart that there were signs that Protestants were recognising the inferiority of their polity, and Catholics the impossibility of their theology. At one time I thought that the Modernist movement in the Catholic Church would mark the beginning of a new and better reformation which would render possible the union of churches on a Catholic or supranational basis. But that hope seems vain, and though few Modernists have become Protestant—why should they ?—most of them have ceased to be

Catholics. Or is this, too, illusion, and has Modernism been suppressed but not destroyed ?

Reunion on a smaller scale, that is to say between Protestant denominations, has in some ways brighter prospects. In America, especially, some of the largest Protestant churches are being brought together by such movements as the " Federation of the Churches of Christ," which is rapidly becoming more important than any single denomination, bringing about exchanges of pulpits and even of membership and undertaking joint enterprises of far-reaching importance.

Immense good has already been done by this movement, which is still in its infancy. It is confronted by three dangers of which its leaders are well aware.

In the first place, in the desire to avoid controversial detail it may sacrifice intellectual sufficiency. Ministers of all denominations are in danger of losing their position as intellectual leaders, and the desire of a younger generation for information and discussion often forces it to look elsewhere for the satisfaction of its legitimate intellectual needs.

In the second place, it may confuse religion with a conventional and cheerful " good-behaviourism." To the onlooker it seems that this danger is serious. Too much emphasis is put on social activity, ministers are required to be popular speakers and " good mixers," pleasant social evenings prove more advantageous to church membership than the severer

exercises of the past; and all theological questions are kept in the background.

Finally there is the terrible danger of political exploitation, and the creation of a "Christian bloc," whose votes will be obtained by politicians willing to pass laws to enforce summarily good conduct and right opinion on all matters. Such a "bloc" is apt to forget that even when the conduct in question is really desirable, it is so only if it be the choice of free men thinking for themselves. There is a real danger of legislation based on local prejudice, and it is significant that, in some States of the Union, laws have already been passed in one and the same legislative form against the sale of cigarettes and the teaching of evolution.

These are serious evils; but they are well known to church leaders and will doubtless be met by them; for as a class they are wise and prudent men and many of them have an insight into spiritual life which unites them with the mystics of all ages.

Over against this "Federating" movement, which is in the main a "concentration on the centre," is the evolution of three types of thought, which are producing cross-sections throughout Protestantism, so that men often stand in closer intellectual sympathy with those of the same type in other churches than they do with others in their own communion.

The most energetic and, I suspect, the largest group, but the least well educated, is the Funda-

mentalist,[1] which has indeed forgotten much of the thought of the past, but has learnt nothing from that of the present. It represents an unwavering attachment to the great traditional doctrines of Christianity. The name "Fundamentalist," was, I believe, first given to them some years ago when they adopted the "quadrilateral of belief,"—the Infallible Inspiration of Scripture, the Deity of Jesus Christ, the efficacy of the Blood Atonement, and the Second Coming of the Lord. The sudden prominence of this movement is a reaction against the intellectual chaos which has often been allowed to serve as a substitute for liberal theology.

But it is a mistake, often made by educated persons who happen to have but little knowledge of historical theology, to suppose that Fundamentalism is a new and strange form of thought. It is nothing of the kind: it is the partial and uneducated survival of a theology which was once universally held by all Christians. How many were there, for instance, in Christian churches in the eighteenth century who doubted the infallible inspiration of all Scripture? A few, perhaps, but very few. No, the Fundamentalist may be wrong; I think that he is. But it is we who have departed from the tradition, not he, and I am sorry for the fate of anyone who tries to argue with a Fundamentalist on the basis of authority.

[1] This name is commonly used in America; it is not, I think, widely known elsewhere, but it is easy to understand, and I do not know any word to take its place which would be equally intelligible on both sides of the Atlantic.

The Bible and the *corpus theologicum* of the Church is on the Fundamentalist side.

At the same time Fundamentalism is not the complete or the intelligent survival of the old theology. The keen metaphysics of the doctrine concerning God and the insight into human nature of the doctrines of sin and of grace are no longer present. The Fundamentalists have zeal, but it is certainly not according to knowledge. Their party is recruited from the "Bible Schools" which in the United States offer a cheaper education for those wishing to be ministers than can be found in Universities or in the Theological Schools that take only college graduates. Men are taught in these schools a very precise theology, are given some admirable practical instruction in the art of speaking, and are inspired with great enthusiasm, partly for the gospel which they preach themselves and partly against the theories which they believe to represent modern science. They are supported by men who know the words of Scripture better than the teaching of science, insist—quite rightly—that the Bible means what it says, and hold that, if the Bible be, as they believe, the revealed word of God, nothing contrary to it can be true or ought to be taught. They are endeavouring to prevent any teaching from being given in state schools or colleges, whether on geology or biology, which conflicts with the Biblical account. The matter is being made a political issue; so many votes can always be secured for the Bible and so few for Science that in some places

no political candidate could be elected who does not hold the "Biblical" views, and no teacher in a public institution could retain his position if he favoured evolution.

There has been in America some surprise at the sudden rise of Fundamentalism in the last five years. But no one who has lived, as I have, in Holland can be astonished. The story of Fundamentalism in America is repeating almost exactly the history of the "Anti-revolutionary" party in Holland. In both countries the underlying causes are general but imperfect education and democratic government. Until 1870 the Dutch Reformed Church was becoming more and more "moderne," that is, "liberal," in theology. After that date a more democratic method of church government was introduced by the Liberal party, and the spread of general education produced a generation which could read, was confident in its own knowledge, and was easily swayed by attacks on scientific thought, and by appeals for the preservation of the faith. The newly enfranchised Calvinists formed a political alliance with the Catholics, and to-day almost all the great churches in the cities are in the hands of "Fundamentalists," who for more than twenty years with only short intervals have shared with the Catholics the government of the land. What happened in Holland with rapidity because of its smallness, may quite well happen, though more slowly, in larger countries.

At the other end of the scale from the Fundamen-

talist is a much smaller group, which is not organised, and has no name, but which I propose to refer to as the Experimentalists.

Many of them belong to no church at all. Some of them have been turned out of orthodox churches, or have left them in despair, others have never belonged to any church. Their position is far harder to describe than that of the Fundamentalists, for they do not specially wish to formulate it into clear cut phraseology. In general they adopt the position, familiar to the Scientist, that experiment is the basis of knowledge. Formerly there was a time when theory came first and experiment was used almost exclusively to corroborate it. The clever *savant* was he who could best explain facts in terms of a given theory. So in religion there was a definite theory—the theology of the Christian Church—and religion—the observed facts of experience or experiment—had to be explained in accordance with it. A man was not counted a Christian or religious because he had made the experiment, but because he accepted the theory.

The Experimentalist feels that this is an utterly false and antiquated attitude. Its parallel would be to claim that a man was a chemist because he accepted the molecular hypothesis—or whatever it is that chemists usually accept—not because he had made experiments and drawn conclusions from these and similar experiments.

The Experimentalist, then, holds that there are two great experiments in life which are the basis of

religion. The first is positive or active; it is made when a man is conscious that there is a purpose in life of which he is only a part, but with which he can coöperate if he choose, *and he does choose.* It is the subordination of the individual self-seeking will to the great purpose of which he discovers some part by this experiment, though it stretches away far beyond his ken.

The act of choice must be emphasised. The Experimentalist deserves his name not because he holds the view that there is a purpose in life—that is theory—but because, believing that there is this purpose, he chooses to make the experiment of becoming its servant. Is there any difference in quality between the Experimentalist who does this and the primitive Christian who consecrated himself to the Kingdom of God? The attitude of mind is the same as that which said, "Thy will, not mine, be done." The difference is that the Experimentalist, especially if he is outside the churches, wishes to state his experiment, and the theory which underlies it, in his own language. After he has done so, he is able to recognise the value and the beauty of the language of the past, even though he cannot make that language his own, for the theory of the past is not the same as his own. If the Fundamentalist is allowed to maintain his position that the membership in the Church means the acceptance of a definite theory, the Experimentalist will stay outside or go outside the Church.

The second experiment comes when the first seems to be beyond his strength. It is negative or passive, or appears so in comparison with the first. It is made when a man is conscious that there is a source of life which imparts help to him when he is weak, comfort when he is in sorrow, and purification when he has sinned. He turns to it when the first experiment seems on the point of breaking down, not because it was a mistake, but because of the human weakness of the experimenter. Each of these experiments can be made in many different ways; no one way is *the* way any more than one kind of test tube is *the* test tube. No conclusion can be valid which ignores the results obtained by any one of these ways.

In the Western world the natural laboratories for religion are the Christian Churches. They should be open to any one who can make use of the opportunities which they provide, not merely to those who are willing to sign in advance the conclusions of former experimenters, and to record their results only in formulae used centuries ago. Religion requires men who will make the experiments, and record them faithfully and intelligibly, not those who repeat other people's formulae, and force their results to agree with them. Experimentalists claim the right to continue in the churches, and feel that the claim of the Fundamentalist to exclude them is based on a radically wrong conception which has survived from an earlier age. The Churches are not societies for the preservation of ancient opinions, but for the

furtherance of living religion. In point of fact, the historian knows that in them no more than in any other society has opinion ever remained stationary; but men have thought that it has, have resisted conscious change as wicked, and made it, as it were, surreptitiously by deceiving themselves into thinking that the ancient beliefs meant something which was often, indeed, true, but had never been contemplated in the past, and was not seldom directly opposed to the original intention of those who formulated them.

The answer of the Fundamentalists to the Experimentalists is simple: there *is* a body of opinion which is true, revealed to man from God; no experiment ought to affect it and, if it seem to do so, it must be wrong. It is right and proper to make experiments, in the sense of making religion a practical living affair, but if they seem to point to any conclusion which contradicts the Bible they are wrong. The Bible is the test of truth, and Revelation is not the same thing as Discovery.

Between the Experimentalist and the Fundamentalist there can be no compromise. The same society cannot permanently be a religious home for both. At the present moment the Fundamentalists seem to be winning in the churches. Unfortunately the Experimentalist frequently helps them by leaving the Church in which he has been brought up and making his religion a private affair. I see no reason for believing that there is less religion to-day among

educated people than formerly, but I think that fewer and fewer feel at home in any Church. They do not argue, but merely drop out of all ecclesiastical affiliations, and by so doing help greatly the cause of Fundamentalism.

Nevertheless in all or almost all churches, there is a large party which holds a mediating position. I shall call it, for reasons which will appear, the Institutionalists. In the first place, it endeavours to reduce to a minimum the amount of "opinion" which must be accepted; in books belonging to this school, this is sometimes called "dropping unessentials," and the unessentials prove to be as a rule those things which the writer in question has come to doubt. In the second place, it endeavours to use the old language to express new meanings, feeling that though it be dangerous to put new wine into old bottles, it is at least always advantageous to keep the old labels. In many ways this school has a long and distinguished history. Often illogical and well adapted to human needs, it changes its ground from day to day, yielding now a little to the Fundamentalist, and now to the Experimentalist, but always remembering the practical necessities of the churches regarded as "going concerns."

It would be hopeless to find any theological unity in this party, which like the Fundamentalists and the Experimentalists, is to be found in every denomination; its real interest is not in thought, but in the institution as such. In it are to be found the

men who feel that the Church subserves the existing orders. Its existence is a necessity at the present moment, and it is constantly recruited by Fundamentalists who have recoiled from some detail of their position, or by Experimentalists who have ceased experiments and feel the need of intellectual and spiritual repose. Its members usually endeavour to compensate for a concession in one direction by obstinate emphasis in another. One man will admit to doubt as to the Resurrection of the Flesh, but will insist on the Virgin Birth, another will be less than absolutely rigid on the Athanasian creed, but adamantine on episcopal ordination.

Each of these three parties has its special strength and weakness.

The Fundamentalist has a tendency to remain wilfully ignorant of modern thought. His worst fault is that, being half educated, he has no doubts. Knowing little history and less science, he often is filled with intellectual pride and spiritual arrogance; in his arguments gross caricature and unmeasured abuse take the place of reason and logic. To him it seems fair to say that evolution means the belief that we are descended from monkeys, and to ascribe an alleged increase in crime to the teaching of scientific theories. But, leaving out a few ecclesiastical politicians, he is sincere and honest, and has a refreshing conviction that the questions which he discusses are intensely important. At his best he is an en-

thusiast; at his worst, an ignoramus, or, if I may coin a convenient word, an "ignoremus."

The Experimentalist, on the other hand, is not so often ignorant, and the more he knows the less likely he is to be confident of his opinions. He sometimes overlooks the importance of the past; is impatient of an ancient theology which he does not understand; forgets that his own experiments are not the only ones which can be made; and does not perceive that if we are to grow in knowledge as well as in grace the need of stating the results of experiments is as great as the necessity of undertaking them. At his worst he is a sentimentalist, slack in conduct and inaccurate in thought; at his best he is a prophet.

The Institutionalist's danger is intellectual dishonesty. In order to preserve the institution, he is constantly tempted to palter with the facts: to be misty in thought and ambiguous in language. He sometimes cries "peace, peace," when there is no peace; he has been known to sacrifice ability and insight, which are difficult to manage, in favour of a safe mediocrity which is quiet in harness, but without him the churches would disintegrate into contentious disruption. At his worst he is an ecclesiastical huckster, and he is never a prophet, but he often builds stately tombs to the prophets of the past, endeavours to perpetuate their teaching, and venerates their memory; at his best he is a statesman who understands the minds of men and a priest who has looked deep into their souls.

Such seem to be the three parties which divide Protestantism to-day, and those who have studied history are aware how uncertain is the immediate issue to the contest. Truth may be with the Scientists, not with those who hold to a belief in an infallible Revelation in the Bible and, if so, it will win ultimately; but its victory may be delayed for generations. If the only choice presented to the mass of people be whether they will have religion without Science, or Science without Religion, some will choose one way, some another. Both will be wrong; and, between them, they will kill educated Christianity. The question is whether the educated men and women who are still within the Church and also understand something of science, can work out, before it be too late, a theology which will provide satisfactory intellectual expression for the religious experience of the next generation. If they can, they will reform Christianity, but whether they can do so depends partly on our all being willing to live together, and on having ecclesiastical leaders wise enough to prevent any party from driving out the others.

There cannot be, and ought not to be, any compromise in principle. But there can be toleration in practice. Personally, I am an Experimentalist; nevertheless, if I were omnipotent to-morrow I should not attempt to expel either the Fundamentalists or the Institutionalists. I believe that if the equilibrium between them can be preserved so that

no one of them shall be prematurely suppressed, the evolution of religion will best proceed ; for permanent progress depends on not leaving out any of the integral parts of society. The Experimentalist could go ahead much faster if he took the advice showered on him by the Fundamentalists and cut himself loose from all affiliation with the existing churches. I think that, so far as he is concerned, he would be better off. But if he has—as I have—any real affection for the institutions of his fathers, he will steadily postpone following this advice so long as he can. He will do best to stay where he is, in whatever church it may be, and by his frank and sometimes painful criticism, help the Institutionalists, who as a rule are far more capable of seeing what is expedient or necessary for the moment and are less troubled by questions of verbal accuracy. He will not receive an official vote of thanks for his pains ; but in private the Institutionalist will admit that he could never have resisted Fundamentalist pressure, had not the flagrant and outspoken heresy of the Experimentalist made his own position appear conservative by contrast.

After all, when the din of controversy dies down and we have each pointed out the weakness—often really present—of our opponents' position, we can admit that on one point we are agreed. We wish to find the truth. We differ in our methods, we differ in the results which we have reached, we do not spare—and we ought not to spare—each other in

controversy and in argument, and it is very improbable that we shall always refrain from the human pleasure of making verbal "scores" at each other's expense. We are aware that our opponents are often unfair and are afraid that possibly we have been so ourselves; but the leaders of all three parties are united in their agreement with Zerubbabel that "Truth beareth away the victory." If after this world we retain any memory of its storms, I do not doubt but that when Fundamentalists, Experimentalists, and Institutionalists enjoy the vision of reality, they will discover that they were all seeing the same vision though imperfectly and from different angles; but I think that only the Experimentalists will have anticipated the discovery.

II
TO-MORROW

V

THE FAITH, THE BIBLE, AND THE CREEDS

THE problems which will be the basis of controversy among the three parties in the immediate future cover the main tenets of Christian theology—that is, the intellectual statement of religion.

The Fundamentalist's position is that there is a theology which is essential to Christianity. Without it a man may be good, pious, and intelligent, but he cannot be a Christian. That essential theology is the Faith once delivered to the Saints, and it must be kept inviolate and inviolable.

The Experimentalist believes that Christianity is a "way of life,"[1] not a form of thought. It was

[1] Christianity is a way of life. But that does not mean that it is a fixed code of morality. Morality is to the practice of Christianity what theology is to its theory; it is the attempt to translate it into thought. But here too the translation is not fixed and cannot be. The "way of life" is changed and enlarged as the problems of existence vary. The Experimentalist does not believe that the morality of yesterday is sufficient for the problems of conduct of to-morrow any more than the theology of yesterday is adequate for the problems of thought. In one sense, and in one only, is it possible to speak of fixity. The way of life is converse with God, not behaviour among men, though behaviour among men is conditioned by it. Yet even here I doubt the complete fixity. Not only individuals but the race of men is growing. The converse of a father with his children changes as they grow, not because he changes, but because they are developing.

explained intellectually by the early Church in accordance with the thoughts and the language of its day. But the explanation is not the same as the thing explained. Both language and thought belong to the past, and the Experimentalist proposes to do for his generation what the early Christians did for theirs—translate the way of life into plain and simple language derived from his own generation. He knows that we must have a theology, but there is for him no such thing as a final theology, any more than there is a final astronomy. Theology, which is a series of propositions, is not, as Fundamentalists believe, a divine revelation made by God, but the human statement—the very imperfect and changing statement—made by men of the communion of God and man. The theology of early Christians is couched entirely in terms of a view of the Universe which is now known to be wrong. Our theology must be put in terms of our own view of the Universe, which is at least better, but if our children find out that we were wrong they must try again. Christianity, for the Experimentalist, is the name of a religion, not of a theology. Therefore he is not frightened at all to find that his thoughts are not those of the early church, and he takes issue with the Fundamentalist on the Faith derived from the Bible and on the Creeds stating it, on the Doctrine of God, and on the view which he takes of Jesus.

The programme of the Institutionalist is different from either that of the Fundamentalist or the Ex-

perimentalist. He believes with the Fundamentalist that there is a " Faith once delivered to the Saints." In practice he tends to become a little foggy if he be pressed to say whether this Faith is a " Way of Life " or a " Form of thought." He recognises with the Experimentalist that the formulae of traditional theology are not wholly satisfactory for the needs of the present generation, and with him he agrees that restatement is necessary, but his restatement means in practice the giving of a new meaning to old words. Frequently the old words are not really susceptible of the new meaning, and the result is that while the typical Institutionalist seems in conversation to agree with the Experimentalist, and in preaching with the Fundamentalist, in the end he succeeds only in making history unintelligible and religion illogical.

The historic faith of the Church, with which the three parties are concerned is as follows: There is One God, who exists eternally in three hypostases,[1] each of whom is fully and eternally divine, just as human beings are all and each of them human. One of these hypostases, the Father, created the Universe, through the second hypostasis, the Son. This Son

[1] I do not know how to translate this word. " Person " is, of course, the classical rendering, but it was never a very good one, and the word has gradually changed its meaning so that it is now terribly anthropomorphic. There is an instructive controversy turning on this point between Bishop Gore and Dr. Rashdall, admirably summarized and criticised in the Blackfriars' Magazine for September, 1922, by Father Vincent McNabb, O.P., in an article entitled *Bishop Gore, Dean Rashdall and St. Thomas Aquinas.*

was the agent of creation, and, when man sinned, was also the agent of salvation, for which purpose he came down from heaven, was made man, being miraculously conceived by the Virgin Mary through the operation of the Holy Ghost, died for us, rose again from the dead, and went back to heaven, and finally will also be the judge at the last day when he will come again to judge the living and the dead. The third hypostasis, the Holy Ghost, is the source of prophecy in the Bible and of the life of the Church.

It is a perfectly clear and consistent whole. It is to be taken or rejected. Nothing is gained by the device of cutting out, for instance, the Virgin Birth, but accepting the doctrine of the Incarnation, or doubting the judgment to come, but insisting on the Trinity. The Incarnation is a far more difficult thing to believe than the Virgin Birth. Nor is it profitable to allegorize or explain away the meaning of the Creed. It presents us with a definite theory of the origin of the Universe, summarizing and accepting the account in Genesis. No one doubts but that this is what the Church Fathers meant, or can doubt it after reading them from Irenaeus onwards.

The basis of this faith was not thought to be discovery by human logic but revelation by the act of God, and this revelation is to be found in the Bible, which is infallible. The summary statement of the faith is the Creeds, which according to Protestant theology have only an " induced " authority, because of their biblical foundation, but according to Catholic

theology have in addition to this the equally infallible authority of the Church.

The Fathers who made the Creed were, indeed, somewhat in doubt as to the exact meaning of a few subordinate details in the narrative of Genesis i-vi; but they thought it was all correct history, the earlier part written by the inspired and infallible hand of Moses at the dictation of God himself, the later parts by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit through Prophets, Evangelists and Apostles. The early chapters of the Old Testament explain the origin of the Universe, the creation of man, his disastrous disobedience and fall, which are the reason why the Incarnation was necessary "for our salvation"; the later parts describe the preparation for the Incarnation; the Gospels tell the story of the birth, life, ministry, death and resurrection of the incarnate Son of God; the Epistles explain its meaning and consequences; and the Apocalypse closes the whole by describing the end of the world, as Genesis describes its beginning. Every detail is necessary to this elaborate system. Without the story of the Creation and the Fall, the doctrine of the Incarnation and the Atonement are meaningless.

I do not think that any early church writer ever taught that the facts mentioned in this faith were only symbolical or allegorical. So far as I know, even Origen never doubted that the story of the creation was literally true. He did undoubtedly think that it also had an allegorical meaning, but that

is typical of his school of interpretation; it added allegory, it did not substitute it for the plain historical meaning. Moreover to take Origen as typical of the early Church is a perversion of history. Would that he had been!

A generation ago it might have seemed ridiculous to suggest that any Christian could abandon these opinions, or to assert that any one can be a Christian without holding them. But events have moved so rapidly that it is not necessary to assert this; the fact is obvious. The Faith has been abandoned, and those who have abandoned it do assert that they are Christians and are recognised as such. All that has to be asked to-day is that this state of affairs be avowed or at least that the ordinances of the church be so changed that they will not keep out young and intelligent men, who feel the painful contrast between what is thought and what is said.

This change is the result of considering the basis of the Faith, the Bible. If the Bible be the infallible inspired revelation made by God to man there is nothing to say against the orthodox theology. The creeds embodying it, can, as the Thirty-nine Articles state, be "proved by most certain warrant of Holy Scripture." The difficulty is that they cannot be proved by anything else, and it is perhaps desirable to emphasize exactly what is meant by being proved by Scripture. It does not mean proved by Scripture after it has been scrutinized and the improbable elements rejected, but by Scripture as it stands

without appeal from one part to another. Thus for instance the Virgin birth is proved because it is asserted in Matthew and Luke. It does not matter that it is not mentioned in Mark, John and Paul. That is what the Articles mean, and what every one meant until the historical criticism of the nineteenth century triumphed.

This historical criticism takes a different point of view. It examines the books of the Bible, as it would any other historical documents, by comparative criticism, and with regard to general probability. Speaking generally the results reached are these. The account given of the creation of the world and the fall of man is a Semitic myth, which has no claim to be regarded as history. Similarly the story of the flood and the re-peopling of the world is myth, not history; the list of long-lived patriarchs down to Abraham has no claim to credence; the stories of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Joseph are legends with little historical value, and it is very doubtful, according to most Egyptologists, whether the Exodus ever took place. All these statements are constantly made in almost any University which teaches Theology. The story of the Kings of Israel and Judah is history, but far from impeccable history, and scholars constantly emend it by reference to Assyrian and other monuments which they regard as far more accurate. Turning to the New Testament it is recognized that the Gospels give contradictory accounts of the life of Jesus in spite of all efforts to

bring them into agreement, and as to the Acts and Epistles the discussion which goes on so vigorously among scholars is as to the extent of the divergence between them, not as to its existence. Finally, the expectation of a " last day " when the living and the dead will be judged is recognized as being just as mythical an account of the end of the world as Genesis is of its beginning.

It might seem that this result is wholly destructive, but it is not. It does indeed destroy the creeds, for their whole foundation is destroyed ; but it strangely reestablishes the Bible as an instrument of education and illumination. It shows very plainly that the Bible is not the revelation of God to man, but it also shows that it is the longest and best record which we possess of the evolution of man, of the gradual growth of his thoughts about God and about himself, and of the development of morality, politics and religion. Many passages which were formerly quite inexplicable as revelation, become most instructive when regarded as evolution.

Take for instance the story thrice told in Genesis of the Patriarch who conspired with his wife to pretend that she was his sister in order to gain favourable terms from a stranger who fell captive to her charm. According to the narrative the only person whom the Almighty punished was the unfortunate stranger who fell into the trap.

That is a little difficult to accept as the infallible revelation of God ; but it is very instructive as one

stage in the process by which man made God in his own image.

Or, again, consider the deceit so successfully used by Jacob to deprive his brother of a blessing. To-day any human court of law would upset that result as due to obvious fraud. But in Genesis the Almighty appears to ratify the blessing. Once more, can that be infallible revelation? The idea is absurd. But it does show the growth of morality and illustrates the way in which a sense of the sanctity of a contract —hence of a blessing—precedes all sense of obligation to speak the truth. The same thing may be observed in children, for the history of the individual repeats the history of the race.

The teaching of the Bible on these lines has only just begun. But though the labourers are few the fields are white unto harvest, for such teaching can be very successful if it be carried out unreservedly. There can, however, be no looking back: the teacher is doomed to failure if he teach alternate chapters as revelation and as evolution.

But though the constructive teaching of the Bible in this way is new, the destructive nature of the criticism on which it is based has been partially recognized for many years. Only partially, however, for though teachers of the Old Testament will cheerfully admit that the chapters of Genesis on which the old system is based are merely a Semitic myth, no more true than other myths which came from Babylon, they often seem ignorant of the immense importance

of their admission. Yet the Fundamentalists are perfectly right in thinking that Genesis is the keystone of all biblical theology, and they are perfectly right in thinking that it cannot be reconciled with modern Science. Where they err is in thinking that it is modern Science which is wrong.

The several breakdowns of the classical Christian theology have not been made plain because Institutionalists have so often covered it up by changes in the meaning of a word. For instance, the belief that God created the world has in fact been abandoned, but this is covered up by saying that evolution is the method of creation. That is not a fair use of language. "Creation" describes a method by which the universe may have been brought into existence, not merely a theory about the ultimate origin of matter. Science, almost universally accepted by educated men, tells us that the world, as distinct from matter, was not brought into existence by creation but by evolution. It was, in all probability, once part of some greater star from which it split off, but what the origin of matter was we do not know. Thus it is true that creation may still be claimed as a possible cause for the existence of matter, but the claim neither carries conviction, nor is capable of refutation, and it is not the same thing as saying that this planet on which we live was created. Those who explain, or rather expound, Genesis in this way are abandoning the Faith just as much as those who state their position more clearly and with

greater propriety of language. To say that evolution is merely the method of creation is a travesty.

Not only is evolution not the method of creation, but those who believe in it do not claim to be able to tell us anything about the origin of matter, or of life. To the scientist the origin of the universe is unknown. It may have had a beginning, or it may be eternal—without beginning or end.[1] All that is certain is that, once in existence, matter "evolves" and life "evolves." Here is the characteristic difference between Experimentalists and Fundamentalists. The Experimentalist wishes to base his religion on the nature of life, which he knows, while the Fundamentalist starts with opinion about the origin of the universe, which he does not know, and cannot prove, but believes on the authority of biblical revelation.

Similarly belief in the Fall and in Redemption has been abandoned; but this has been hidden by the use of "Fall" and "Redemption" to mean something else, so that change of thought has been hidden by abuse of language. The Fall meant that man was created innocent and sinless; but he disobeyed the command of God and so brought Sin and Death into the world. That is a myth, and few educated men believe it; but many believe that the first dawning consciousness of sin was a turning point in the history of the race. By calling this the Fall they think that

[1] Dean Inge thinks that the universe may be eternal. A few years ago such a statement would have been regarded as extremely heretical. But to-day no one notices it. It is the measure of how far we have left the historic faith of our ancestors.

they are preserving the historic faith. So, too, Redemption meant that the death of Jesus enabled men to be set free from the consequences of the Fall. It was a great, divine act planned for men. Apart from a belief in the historic Fall, an historic Redemption is meaningless. Therefore, many Christans to-day try to substitute a different theory, and call it Redemption. They think that the example of a perfect life lived by Christ is "Redemption." They would find it rather hard to discover this doctrine in the New Testament, especially in the Pauline epistles, but they do not often look, and, when they do, imagine that the difficulty is to be laid to the charge of Paul's obscurity of style.

Creation, Fall, and Redemption are three parts of the "Faith" which have really dropped out, and though the words have been to some extent retained by Institutionalists by being applied to other doctrines even the words are heard less and less. The Experimentalist is likely to give them up altogether.

The controversy over the Bible took place in the second half of the nineteenth century. It was a complete victory for the "critical" position so far as all essentials were concerned, but even more a success for Institutionalists. While yielding to criticism all the really important points, they appeared before the public as having overcome it gloriously. The decisive defeats of the traditional position were accepted silently, but victories in occasional skirmishes

were loudly heralded as great triumphs. That the Creation-narrative is a Semitic myth passed almost unchallenged, but the mention of a King of Israel on an Assyrian monument was heralded as a vindication of Biblical accuracy. The mistakes of critics were pointed out with merciless precision; their main contentions were quietly accepted and camouflaged.

The result has been that the public as a whole has been extraordinarily ignorant of what has happened. It has heard from many pulpits of the wickedness of the "higher critics," and has not realized that most of the statements of these same critics are being taught daily in theological schools. In consequence of this there has been a secondary controversy about the creeds, which, after all, only embody the teaching of the Bible. These creeds are short and explicit, and the public has been surprised to find how many things they can be supposed to mean. But it has been so strenuously maintained that the creeds must be accepted, and their real meaning is so simple and clear that Institutionalists are likely to find it a difficult task to persuade men that they can be used to express modern thought quite as well as ancient belief, even when the ancient belief which they were written to express has been generally abandoned.

The origin of the creeds is far from plain in all its details, but it is tolerably clear that three stages can be traced in their use. The ancient creeds were originally formulae used in the preparation of catechumens for baptism, and inserted at an early

date into the Baptismal service. They all retain in their structure traces of being expansions and explanations of the Baptismal formula "In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost." The method of expansion and the nature of the explanation varied, but it had become locally stereotyped before the fourth century. Thus what we call the Apostles' Creed is a later edition of the old Roman form, and the "Nicene" Creed is an ancient form used at Jerusalem, edited by additions and corrections taken from the creed accepted by the Council of Nicaea, which creed was in turn an amended edition of the ancient creed of Caesarea.

The Council of Nicaea in 325 marked a new epoch. Hitherto creeds had been—so far as we can see from the rather scanty evidence—essentially educational documents, though doubtless formulated so as to exclude false opinion. Their modern analogue is the catechism, not the Thirty-nine Articles. But the Council of Nicaea made the creed into a bulwark of theological defence against Arianism. Its revision of the creed of Caesarea was specially drawn up to state one and to exclude another definite opinion about the nature of God. It is often thought that this creed is the one used in the Mass to-day both in the Catholic and the English churches, but this is not the case, for in the fifth century or earlier, in some way which has never been fully cleared up, its place and ultimately its name was taken by the revised form of the early creed of Jerusalem. It was this

secondary[1] "Nicene" creed which was ultimately put into the Mass, which originally had none.

This introduction of creeds as theological bulwarks in the fourth century produced a flood of creeds, most of which died after short and unhappy lives. They are buried for the use of the curious or the learned in Hahn's classical *Bibliothek der Symbole*. Their importance is that they show how easy the church in the fourth century thought it was to revise the creed, and how difficult it proved in practice.

The fifth and following centuries saw a new movement. The services of the Church for worship were rapidly developing, and place was made in them for the recitation and chanting of doctrinal utterances. Into the Mass was introduced the "Nicene" Creed, and the Apostles' Creed, besides retaining its position in the Baptismal service, was put into use in certain daily offices.

Two other doctrinal statements were composed by unknown or obscure writers and were ultimately taken into some of the "hours" of worship for the clergy. One of these was the Athanasian Creed, composed, not improbably, in the monastery of Lerins at the beginning of the fifth century, the other was the Te Deum, written at about the same time by Nicetas of Remesiana, a town not far from Nish in Servia.

All these stages of the use of creeds are clearly preserved by their treatment in the English Prayer

[1] There is not much difference in doctrine—none of importance.

book. The Apostles' Creed, the old Roman baptismal confession, as is fitting for a daughter of Rome, is found in the baptismal service and in the catechism. This represents the earliest period. The three creeds—the Apostles', Nicene, and Athanasian—are accepted in the Thirty-nine Articles in perpetuation of the second stage, the protection against heresy. The Apostles' and the Athanasian Creeds and the Te Deum are found in the Order for Morning and Evening Prayer, representing the adaptation of the clerical "hours" for general use, and the Nicene creed is kept, as is right, for the Communion service. These historic lines of demarcation are not quite so clear in the American Prayer book, which has gone on the assumption that the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds are interchangeable—which is historically untrue and archaeologically painful.

The basis of the doctrinal and historical statements in the Creeds is accurately stated in Article VIII. "The Three Creeds, Nicene Creed, Athanasius' Creed, and that which is commonly called the Apostles' Creed, ought thoroughly to be received and believed; for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture." This reflects all Catholic and Protestant belief; but it does not mean—as one might sometimes suppose—that the statements in the creed can be proved out of the Bible by the ordinary methods of historical criticism and research, but that, the Bible being taken, as the writers of the Thirty-nine Articles assumed it ought

to be, as the infallible source of revealed truth, both metaphysical and historical, the conclusions of the creeds logically follow, as indeed they undoubtedly do. They do not, I believe, all follow if we treat the Bible as we should treat any other historical source—and it is thus that scholars of the New Testament do habitually and rightly treat it—but they certainly follow if the Bible be accepted as Revelation.

What, it may be asked, is the difference on this point between Catholic and orthodox Protestant teaching? There is absolutely no difference whatever. Catholics and orthodox Protestants hold the Bible as the inspired and infallible word of God and accept the creeds as based on it. Those who think otherwise may be right—I think that they are—but it is reason and argument, not tradition or authority to which they can appeal. The difference between Catholic and Protestant is not in the basis on which they rest the creeds, or in their attitude to the Bible, but in the fact that the Catholic believes that he has an inspired and infallible interpreter of Scripture in the Church, which ratified the creeds, while Protestants recognize none. Thus for both Catholic and Protestant the Bible is the authoritative statement of revealed truth, and is the common basis of belief for all churches. It is not a question of one clause or another in the creeds but of a whole system of thought which is still clearly held by Catholics, and has not consciously been given up by most Protestant churches, even though they have actually abandoned

much of it, and have ceased to enforce the creeds which summarise it. Taken as a whole they represent nothing but what could be proved out of the Bible, assuming, as was always done until the nineteenth century, that the statements in the Bible are true, accurate and infallible. On the basis of the Bible a theory of the origin of the Universe and of the salvation of man was built up, and this makes the Faith of the Creeds and of the Bible.

The controversy about the creeds has been very bitter; it is still a contentious subject, especially in America; nevertheless I believe that it is almost dead, and the present agitation is only its death agony. Even so a dead controversy, if not suitably buried, is sometimes a more serious evil than a living one. It is therefore not inexpedient to discuss it a little further.

Like so many quarrels it began with a matter which was really quite secondary. The writer of the Athanasian Creed had begun and ended his theological statements by devoting to perdition those who did not agree with them. "This," he says, "is the Catholic faith, which except a man believe faithfully he cannot be saved." From the fourth century to the nineteenth this was a commonplace of theology: without orthodoxy of belief salvation was, normally speaking, regarded as impossible. The general belief of the church is succinctly expressed by the Athanasian creed. But in the middle of the nineteenth century this began to offend the conscience of many

who, feeling quite unable really to understand the delicate metaphysics of the doctrine of the Trinity, especially when stated in an elaborate series of paradoxically antithetic statements, doubted whether failure to believe what they could not understand would necessarily consign them to the flames of hell. The conscience of the laity was quieted by the suggestion of mistranslation. It was urged—not erroneously but quite irrelevantly—that *Quicumque vult salvus esse* might be rendered "Whosoever wishes to be safe." It might be: the rendering would however be probably wrong, and implies in English the idea of some extraordinary and not wholly necessary measure of precaution, which is very far from the original. In any case it certainly could not wipe out the terrific "without doubt he will perish eternally" in the next clause. The contention, however, that in some way the creed did not mean what it seemed to say, was successfully employed by the Institutionalists of the day to satisfy the laity, and I expect that it is still often maintained. Among the clergy some simply dropped the creed altogether; this defiant breach of the law was never punished, though often spoken against, and at the present day, in spite of the rubrics of the church and the Thirty-nine Articles, belief in the view of salvation so clearly stated in the Athanasian Creed has been given up by a large proportion of the clergy and by almost all the laity.

Liberal churchmen at one time were inclined to

make the mistake of agitating for a revision of the Athanasian Creed, or for its abolition from the Prayer book. But even while this was being done the controversy progressed and included the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds. Once more secondary points bore the brunt of the attack. It was noted that phrases such as " He descended into Hell " or " He ascended into Heaven " were incompatible with modern views of the universe. A local Hell and a local Heaven, to which descent or ascent were possible, had become incredible. Bishop Gore and others felt this incredibility—nevertheless they felt also that the creed must be believed; therefore they explained that Heaven and Hell must be taken symbolically, because taken literally they are incredible. Their reason for this was a correct understanding of the modern science of physics. But others went further: they were impressed by the modern study of history and found the Virgin Birth and the physical resurrection of Christ most imperfectly witnessed to by history, and impossible of credence. They proposed to use the same liberty of interpretation that Bishop Gore had used with regard to the Ascension.

Such liberty was indignantly denied them by Dr. Gore, but it has been widely taken by Liberal clergy, who justify it, not unreasonably, as the application of his own method. For practical purposes the question was settled by the classical failure of the protest of Bishop Gore against Dr. Hensley Henson when he was appointed by the Crown to the See of

Hereford. Bishop Gore protested on the ground that Dr. Henson's published writings indicated disbelief in some articles of the creed. Dr. Henson stated, however, that he accepted the creed *ex animo*,[1] and all legal controversy was at an end. Though Bishop Gore probably might have proved that Dr. Henson's writings showed that his belief was not that intended by the creed, he would himself not have come into court with theologically clean hands, for the same could be shown even more clearly of his own writings; the only difference being that the clauses of the creed which he "re-interpreted" are not those which he was anxious to maintain in all their rigour against Bishop Henson. It would perhaps have been possible to prove, what most of us thought was obvious, that Bishop Henson did not believe the doctrines which the creeds were written to protect: but he did "believe them" in the sense of being willing to accept their phraseology to cover his own meaning, and that was sufficient for ecclesiastical purposes.

At the present moment it seems as though this solution of the question of creeds will be allowed to become customary. This is, I believe, certainly true in England, and I expect that a similar position will be reached in America. The manifesto of the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge, Massachusetts, called out by a Pastoral Letter of the Bishops emphasizing the necessity of believing the

[1] I do not translate this phrase for I am not quite sure of Dr. Henson's meaning.

creeds, and especially the clause about the Virgin Birth, is an admirable example of Institutionalism of the kind described above. Its keyword is:

"Are we prepared for a rigid, even-handed, legalistic application of the whole standard of doctrine, discipline, and worship? Such an application of the standard plainly embodied in the Ordinal would bind us to a view of the Scriptures held strictly by few of the ministers of this Church."

It goes on to say:

"We venture to believe that there are many within the Church who could not confidently affirm a bodily ascension, or a visible coming down again of Christ from heaven for judgment, or a raising up again of their flesh, who now express through this ancient medium what they believe to be the under lying religious truths, as, for example, that Christ truly went to God to share in His glory, that in Christ we face our final judge, and that God will bring us after death into eternal life. We are unable to recognize a distinction which would permit interpretation of these other clauses and deny it in the case of the Virgin Birth. The latter is simply the last of those clauses to which interpretation is applied. All alike are interpretations enforced by a doubt concerning the literal historical facts clearly indicated by the words."

The important thing to notice in this manifesto is that it assumes throughout that there is an appeal from the letter of scripture, from its obvious meaning,

from the creeds, and from the opinion of the ancient church, to historical truth discovered by critical research. In this the writers accept the central position of the Experimentalist. But they also insist on the importance of retaining the Creeds at all costs, and here they align themselves with the Fundamentalists. The apparent difficulty of this position is met by explaining that the creeds mean not what their writers say that they meant, but a series of propositions more in accord with modern thought, and sufficiently vague to arouse no ill feeling. The writers express themselves thus :—

" Every man, who enters in the religious meaning of the ancient Creeds, stands upon his feet and joins hands with the great body of Christians throughout the centuries, and says that he believes in God, that he believes in a Righteous Will working in creation ; he believes in Christ, the Son of God, the very life and love of God in terms of our human life ; he believes in the Church, the fellowship of those who draw their strength from Christ ; he believes in forgiveness, the undiscouraged love for one another ; he believes in our victory over death and the life of ever-deepening fellowship."

This is very beautiful language, and reflects a spirit of true Evangelical piety. It is a pity that Arius did not know that this is what the Creed meant : he need never have hesitated to sign it. But I doubt if Athanasius would have refrained from comment had he been told that this is what was meant by the

words for which he suffered so much. I doubt also the wisdom of this line of action. It ends—or may end—controversy within the Church, but it will disgust those who are without and serve as an effectual barrier to prevent men from taking orders, for it seems (though unfairly) to represent a lower standard of intellectual honesty than would be tolerated in any other profession. The only satisfactory action for those who do not accept the Creeds in the sense in which they were written is to say so plainly, and to urge their abolition as official statements of the doctrine which is now held in the Church.

It would seem that this is a clear issue. But it is not. For the Creeds are not merely official statements of doctrine, but part of the Liturgy, and in dealing with the Liturgy those born in the English Church, and still more those who, like myself, were ordained in it long before they realized any of these theological problems, perceive that the difficulty is to preserve, not to destroy. If it were merely that we had outgrown the theology of the Creeds it would be easy enough to drop them. "The Histories of Christianity" are all full of doctrines which have been dropped and forgotten. Indeed it may truly be said that the doctrines embodied in the Creed have been already forgotten by most clergy and ministers of all denominations. To drop the creeds would be to register a fact, not to introduce a revolution. Examining chaplains and others who test theological

knowledge know how few ministers could give any correct account of those very doctrines, the expression of which they are so anxious to retain. But this is because the Creeds are not mere statements of doctrine. Their use as theological statements for the prevention of wrong opinion or heresy is antiquated, and ridiculous because ineffective; it ought to be abandoned. If it be not the Church will become intellectually effete: for theologically the Creeds are all Fundamentalist, and they cannot be anything else.

But their use, as shown above, is not chiefly theological, and is rooted in the liturgical customs of the Church. The creeds which were not taken into the liturgy have irrevocably perished, but those which are recited in the services of the church live on. It is this liturgical character which is often forgotten. Not a few of my friends often object to me that they cannot understand how any one can wish to remain in a church which has a creed that he does not believe. They obviously cannot: but this is largely because they look on a creed as a theological document,—and as nothing more—while we more often regard it as an integral part of an extraordinarily beautiful work of art as well as of theology,—the Christian liturgy. It is perfectly true that the theology of this liturgy is quite alien to mine, or to that of any Experimentalist. So is the theology of those who built Durham Cathedral. Nevertheless the liturgical art of the services of the church, like the architectural art of its cathedrals, rouses a response in me which cannot

be wakened by any modern service or by any modern building, even though its theology may be irreproachably up-to-date.

Those who feel thus will not easily be persuaded out of the Church either by members of other communions, however friendly, or by those of their own, however disagreeable, for the Church is not a theological society to which we belong for opinion's sake, or a club which we join for the society of its members, but a great tradition, in which thought, music, letters and other arts have been combined by our ancestors to the furtherance of religion and the life of the spirit. Neither the thought nor the music nor the literature is ours: we can admire but not reproduce it. Those who are in authority in the Church can insist, if they choose, that no one shall remain who does not accept the theology of the liturgy. This is what Fundamentalists wish; there is a certain logic in their position, but if they succeed they will kill the Church, just as certainly as they would if they insisted that every one must accept the theology of those who built the cathedrals, or forego their use.

But the Institutionalist seems to me to be on this question almost as dangerous. He ought surely to say frankly "We will give up the creeds as theological statements, but retain them as an integral part of a beautiful service, which was drawn up by men whose thoughts are not our thoughts, but whose spiritual children we are. The creeds do not represent our belief; the 'I' in them refers only to the author;

but the service is our heritage, which we will neither give up nor mutilate." If he were to say this, it would open the doors to many who wish to enter, but are kept out by their dislike of seeming constantly to affirm what they do not really believe. Moreover it would render it unnecessary for the teachers of a theological school to write that ministers of their church do not really hold strictly to what they say when at their ordination they state that they unfeignedly believe all the Canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament.[1]

Such a position cannot affect those who were ordained in the belief that their answer to the ordination vows was perfectly sincere. Few of us have learnt nothing since we were twenty-three years old; but we cannot sit still silent. We do not intend to abandon the Church either to obscurantist reaction or to confusion of thought. The questions in the Ordinal are hopelessly out of date, and ought to be abolished. Willingness to serve and ability to give service are the two necessities, not an immature agreement with ancient opinions. But the Liturgy is a different thing: it ought to be preserved with as much care as a Cathedral, with as little change as possible. Of course to try to revise or to bring it up

[1] "An application," says the manifesto of the Cambridge Episcopalians, "of the standard plainly embodied in the Ordinal would bind us to a view of the Scriptures held strictly by few of the ministers of the Church. Presumably the question in the Ordering of Deacons, 'Do you unfeignedly believe all the Canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments?' means what it says." Yes: but apparently the presumption does not apply to ordinands.

to date is not impossible, nor would it be impossible to try to modernize Durham Cathedral, but . . .

To retain the creeds as part of an uplifting and inspiring liturgy, to abandon them as statements of thought is a possible programme for the Experimentalist, and may, I believe, be adopted before long by many Institutionalists. An alternative, which is I think less desirable but is more likely to be chosen, is a change in the rubric of the service which will render the use of the creeds optional. That will certainly relieve the pressure, and would almost at once result in the omission of the creeds in many, if not in most churches. My reason for thinking it somewhat less desirable is merely aesthetic: I think it would injure the service regarded as a beautiful thing. It is, however, more probable because there is a growing tendency to feel the moral objection to the use of a creed which is no longer believed in the sense in which it was intended to be taken, and every year sees this feeling increase and makes it more likely that the creeds will be made as intolerable for liturgical use as they are already for doctrinal definition. But there is one thing of which liberals, whether Experimentalist or Institutionalist, must beware. It will be disastrous to drop one creed and retain another. The objections which are valid and permanent apply to the Apostles' Creed as much as to the Nicene, and to the Nicene as much as to the Athanasian. To drop one and retain another would imply that for some reason the

one retained was preferable, and would certainly indicate that it must be taken literally. That would, from the point of view of any liberal, be a concession to Fundamentalists which would be fatal.

It would be fatal, not merely because it would strengthen enormously the hands of all who wish to enforce a real belief in the creeds as a condition of membership in the Church, but also because it would effectually keep out the younger generation, which, even as it is, is largely deterred from the ministry by intellectual difficulties. Men would feel that the Church, by dropping one of the creeds, had clearly affirmed the necessity of the others, and had put an end to the period in which it was possible to say that no one really accepted them in their original sense, but only with a "re-interpretation" rendering them susceptible of any meaning which seemed desirable.

The objection has been sometimes made—notably by Bishop Lawrence of Massachusetts—that we must always have opinions, and opinions must be formulated into creeds. I think that the Bishop is only half right. Opinions certainly are necessary to human life. You cannot be a chemist without having opinions about chemical facts. But as knowledge grows opinions do and ought to change. The chemists of to-day might conceivably draw up a series of propositions embodying what is—at present—correct opinion on chemistry; though the scene which would ensue would probably resemble the councils of the fourth century in their animation. If then it were

next decreed that no one should enter any of the great laboratories unless he first signed these propositions, the situation would be similar to that in the Church to-day.

Go on one step further and suppose that a body of chemists should arise who after years of research found that some of these opinions, or even all of them, were wrong, and ask what would happen. Would they be told that they were dishonest to stay in the laboratory? Would a body of Fundamentalists arise who would say "None may enter here who does not hold the opinions of the old chemists—the faith once delivered to Faraday," or would they be told that though their discoveries were true they must be stated in the old language, so that the creed of the chemist should be kept inviolate in word though transmuted in meaning? The supposition is ridiculous. The use of a creed would kill chemistry, and it may easily kill the Church. We need opinions, clean-cut, sharply divided, severely tested, constantly revised, but we do not need creeds. For Churches and Chemical Laboratories though otherwise widely different have this in common. They exist for the finding of truth, and the furtherance of life, not for the preservation of past opinion. Opinion is the partial, imperfect and temporary statement of truth already gained, in order that we may learn to correct it and improve it. A creed is the petrification of opinion.

There is, of course, behind the fear of abandoning the Creeds the dread that without them undesirable

persons will enter the ministry. But this dread is an illusion; other societies live satisfactorily without creeds, and those branches of the Christian Church which have no creeds do not suffer more than those which have many. Creeds may keep out the intelligent and the conscientious; they cannot exclude the ignorant or the deceitful.

It might seem that the preceding pages refer to yesterday rather than to to-morrow; but the controversy as to the Bible, the Creeds, and the opinions which are based on them, is the issue which will decide whether Experimentalists will be able to remain in the Christian community or be obliged gradually to accept the position that they have been excluded and must satisfy their religious necessities outside of the Church of their fathers.

In one sense the Experimentalists are on the defensive. They are constantly put by their Institutionalist opponents into the position of those who deny. And indeed it is true that they do deny much which was once believed. The issue between them and the Fundamentalists is clear. But the difference between them and the Institutionalists is mainly in language. The Institutionalist really denies just as much, but he does so by perverting historical formulæ instead of admitting that he has given up belief in them. Moreover, though the Experimentalist does deny much which was once believed he is not without something positive to say about God, and about religion.

VI

GOD AND PRAYER

SINCE the time of the Greek philosophers and possibly earlier, there has always been a struggle between three forms of thought in which the word "God" has played a part.

The oldest is Anthropomorphism. It believes that the universe is governed by the action of beings or of a being, who may be generally described as a magnified and improved man, who is thought of as a king, leader and father, inspiring his worshippers with fear, courage and affection. To this stage belong most if not all the writings in the Bible, and among early Christian writers Irenaeus is its best representative.

A second is Materialism. It believes that only Matter is real, and uses "God" either to describe the totality of matter, or that part of matter sometimes called "spirit," which governs and controls the rest. To this stage belongs Stoicism and its allied forms of thought. Among Christians it is represented by Tertullian, and it is a debateable point whether the Gospel of John does not belong to it. The question on which this problem turns is the

meaning of "Spirit" and of "Logos," and so far it remains unsettled.

The third and probably most recent form of thought is that of Immaterialism, which if not introduced by Plato is at least always connected with his name. It maintains the reality of the Immaterial, of Values, Ideas, and Thought. It uses "God" to describe the reality and unity of this Immaterial reality. Among Christians its best early representatives are Clement and Origen, and generally speaking since their time the main stream of Christian philosophy has belonged to this school or to offshoots from it.

All three of these forms of thought have left their impress on Christian theology, and each has its special strength. Immaterialism, perhaps, appeals most to the intellect, but it is somewhat cold and to some minds uninspiring; Anthropomorphism stimulates the imagination, and feeds the soul, but the minds of the educated find less and less satisfaction in it.

However much our inherited sentiments may shrink from the admission, the scientists are to-day almost unanimous in saying that the universe as they see it contains no evidence of the existence of any anthropomorphic God whatever. The Experimentalist wholly agrees that this is so. Nevertheless he refuses as a rule—and I think rightly—to abandon the use of the word "God." The use of the word is common to all who are in the true line of descent from Origen, an ancestry which, though ecclesiastically

not free from reproach, is intellectually adorned by many princes of thought and lords of language. Moreover though "Theist," which properly describes a person who believes that there is a God, is a technical term with no popular connotation, "Atheist" has retained from Roman times the general connotation [1] of "enemy of society," and has had that connotation confirmed by the "secularist" controversy of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Therefore the Experimentalist has on this question joined hands with the Institutionalist and used "God" in his own sense, endeavouring partly to preserve Origen's meaning of the word, and partly shrinking from any other policy as open to misconstruction.

What then is the meaning which the Experimentalist wishes to give to the word "God"?

First, and most difficult of all, I think that many Experimentalists will affirm the reality of the Immaterial, and that their God is Immaterial Reality. But I am not quite sure that they will all hold the same views as to the relation between the Immaterial and the Material, and I certainly hope that none will make the mistake of turning this, or anything else, into a new creed. Nor do I see how any one can be quite sure on this point, which has behind it so many centuries of keen metaphysical controversy.

To me the arguments for the reality of the Im-

[1] "Agnostic" was invented largely to avoid this connotation, but it did not do so.

material are convincing, nor do I doubt that we are ourselves immaterial on one side of our nature. The laws which govern the Universe, and the purpose which it is accomplishing, are not material, but they are real, and the form which matter takes depends on them. But whether the existence of matter, as distinct from its form, depends on them is a problem which there is no evidence to solve. I see no more reason to affirm than to deny creation, nor do I believe that this question has the smallest importance for religion or for the conduct of human life. Nor, on the other hand, can I see any final argument by which to answer the nominalist-materialists' view that the Immaterial is derived from and dependent on matter, though their opinion seems to me the less probable. There are those who think that the multiplication table depends for its truth on the existence of material objects to count. To them mathematical law is posterior to and derived from matter. In the language of the schoolmen they believe in *Universalia* only *post rem*. Similarly they think that the moral and aesthetic law is merely the statement of certain aspects of material existence. Nevertheless the fact that these laws do exist now is not denied by materialists, and many materialists obey them with a thoroughness which few Immaterialists equal. Personally I am not a Materialist, I have never been one, nor do I think that I shall be. But to say that a Materialist cannot have any true religion, or be a Christian, would be absurd if it were

not so serious. The nature and origin of matter and of "laws" is an obscure problem. Few really understand it; none have solved it. To obey the laws is more important than to hold an opinion as to their origin. For this reason, though the Immaterialist has the right to say that he finds Immaterial Reality dominant in the Universe, and desires consciously to subordinate his life to it, and though he may regard this as identical in fact with what our fathers called "godly life," it is improbable that he ever can or will claim that this solves the riddle of the Universe, or the relation between the Material and Immaterial. The riddle of the Universe is a scientific, not a religious question.

A different way of putting the same thing is to speak of "Values" instead of "Immaterial Reality." This view equally affirms the reality of Truth, Beauty, and Wisdom, and identifies them with God who is all of the "Values" taken together.

A slightly variant attitude on this point is represented by Dean Inge's *Confessio Fidei*. He presents with conviction and power the case in favour of the ultimate reality of "Values." But instead of saying that these Values are God, he seems to postulate a God of whom the Values are the attributes, and then argues as though this postulate were the explanation of the Values and the foundation of Christianity. This seems to me regrettable; the Dean is a true Experimentalist, though rather intolerant of those who happen to make experiments other than his own

or to deduce different conclusions. Here he seems to forget the real difference between the Experimentalist and the Fundamentalist. To the Experimentalist intellectual progress depends on beginning with what is known and working outward. The Fundamentalist on the other hand begins with an assumption about the unknown and relegates to outer darkness those who refuse to accept it. So it is with belief in God. The Experimentalist believes that we know the reality of the Immaterial, and the reality of values. The word God sums up for him the totality of our knowledge on these points, and also everything belonging to them which is still unknown. It describes—in the best and truest sense of the word—an hypothesis. The important question for the Experimentalist is not whether men accept this hypothesis, or think that another is possible, or use another name to describe it, but whether they do or do not order their lives in accordance with the "Values" which they know. To do this is religion, the rest is theology, and Christianity is primarily religion and only secondarily theology.

Equally important, and certainly more easily intelligible[1] than the doctrine of Immaterial Reality or of Values, is a third form of thought, which recognizes

[1] Not, I think, because it is intrinsically easier to grasp, but because all training in physical science prepares the way for it, while the necessary preparation for an understanding of "Values," or of "Immaterial Reality" is metaphysical. Modern education has emphasized the theory of physics, while metaphysics have followed the road chosen by the later Stoics, and been confused with ethics.

Purpose in the Universe, and calls it God. Perhaps it is even more important, for it certainly has a more immediate influence on life. Many scientists would object to this word Purpose,[1] as stating too much, but though I feel the force of their objections, any other word seems to me to state too little.

This form of thought is, I believe, very commonly found to animate the younger men of our generation. They feel that the world in which we live is the expression of some great plan or purpose or pattern which is not yet complete, which shows no sign of finality, but is ever growing in complexity; which resolves itself again and again into simplicity, and then spreads out again on a yet wider scale. The plan or purpose is not a dead mechanical thing; the life which explains it is within and not without it. Men are partly the result, but partly also the instruments or even agents of this purpose. Wisdom is the right understanding of its nature; and righteousness is the attempt to subordinate human purposes to this great purpose of life. For man is not only an effect, he is a cause. When he acts, he brings into existence a new cause of which the results will follow in accordance with the established laws of reality. But there is a moment of choice, when he has it within his power to decide whether he will act or not. If he choose right, his actions will be taken up into the great web of existence, consistently with

[1] See, for instance, L. J. Henderson's *The Fitness of the Environment*, a book which all theologians ought to read and ponder.

the great purpose. If he chose wrongly, the results will in the end be destroyed, not without suffering to himself and others.

To a more vivid imagination which thinks in pictures rather than in metaphysical language, life presents itself as a great web which is slowly coming from the loom, and sometimes there seems to be behind the loom the figure of the great weaver; at other times the weaving is being carried on by men and women whose weaving sometimes conforms, sometimes does not, to an infinitely complicated but symmetrical plan which, and here is the paradoxical tragedy, they can only see in the web which has been already woven; but they know that whether what they weave will remain or not depends upon its being in accord with the pattern. And then the picture changes slightly, and it seems as though the pattern begins to reveal the same features as those dimly discerned in the weaver behind the loom. And yet again the picture changes, and it is not merely the great weaver, but the men and women who are working that reappear with him to live on in the pattern emerging in the web.[1]

The concrete expression of the "Purpose" is the "Laws of the Universe," of which the Natural Scientist and the Historian are the interpreters. Our knowledge of these Laws is small and constantly subject to revision, but so far as we see they are

[1] I have ventured to quote this paragraph from my own *Landmarks in the History of Early Christianity:* Macmillan, 1920.

themselves quite unchangeable and belong to the Immaterial rather than the Material.[1] Nevertheless their results are constant change,—that change which we call evolution, though involution would be quite as accurate. It is the ultimate sum of these results—always related to an infinite future as well as to an infinite past—taken together with the Laws which govern it, of which I think when I speak of Purpose. Is the Experimentalist justified in using the word "God" in this sense? I think he is, though I am not quite sure, but in any case the Institutionalist is justified, for it is certainly doubtful whether he can save the institutions which he loves unless he can in this way modify the meaning of the word "God." Moreover he is only doing what was done before his time by previous generations. The Christian Neoplatonists from Origen to Dean Inge are remarkable for their successful efforts to make Jesus express the sentiments of Plato, and Plato teach the doctrines of Paul. The Institutionalists of to-day are doing the same thing as their predecessors, but assimilating modern Science instead of Platonism. It would be fatal for a historian[2]

[1] I do not add the word Reality because I do not wish to assume the result of the controversy, still unfinished though waged in constantly changing terminology, between Realists, Nominalists and Conceptualists. If Bernard of Clairvaux, William of Occam, and Abelard could be brought back to life, and made contemporary with us and each other they would learn all that we have to give, and then repeat their old controversies.

[2] It is noticeable how few of the "succession" of Christian Neoplatonists have shown any understanding of History.

to follow their example. Nevertheless he has to record the fact that just as Origen, by assimilating Neoplatonism, made Christianity possible for the educated men of the third century, so it is conceivable that an Institutionalist who will do the same with Science may render Christianity possible for the educated men and women of the next generation.

This recognition of Purpose as God will, I believe, be one of the foundations of the Theology of to-morrow. The Fundamentalist will of course object that this is a denial of a belief in a Personal God. This objection is in part merely a verbal point. In part it is a criticism not indeed essentially valid, but directing attention to the weakness of this form of expression. This "Purpose"-terminology is undoubtedly cold and emotionally unsatisfying. But that is the defect of the language, not of the nature of the Experimentalist or the meaning of his thoughts; for as a rule he has been too often caught in the clutch of unseen hands which whirl him about for good and evil, to doubt the existence of spiritual powers greater than himself, even though he reject wholly the anthropomorphism of such language. Like St. Paul he knows that we wrestle with Principalities and Powers, like the Gnostics he has passed trembling along the narrow bridge, over the abyss and between the demons, like the poet he has been conscious of the "helping hand of grace" and can say . . .

> "He leads us on, through all the unquiet years;
> Past all our dreamland hopes, and doubts, and fears
> He guides our steps."

If in general he prefers to say too little rather than to say too much, to be cold rather than sentimental, he is impelled, not by any lack of experience, but by a deliberate preference for economy of utterance over exuberance of expression.

But responsibility for misunderstanding must be laid partly on the Protestant teachers of the last century. They have allowed the land to have rest for more than the traditional forty years from theological teaching in the pulpit. The investigation of the universe has gone on independently of the churches; ministers in their general knowledge of this subject are often far below the level of their congregations, and the belief of the average half-educated man has degenerated into a conviction that though the doctrine of the Trinity is beyond his powers of comprehension, respectability demands acceptance of a "Personal God," by which he means a "Governor of the Universe" of an anthropomorphic type.[1] He has never been told, and the clergy who minister to him are frequently ignorant of the fact, that orthodox Catholic doctrine never stated its belief in this kind of Personal God: what it did state was that God, the One Supreme reality, is found in Hypostases, which in Latin theology is

[1] To the Church Historian there seems a great similarity between this "half-educated" theology and the Monarchianism (of both types) in the third century. Hippolytus or Origen would be as unpopular now as then, but Theodotus and Noetus would be quite successful; Zephyrinus would certainly retain his rank, though Callistus would probably be in politics.

"Persons," a subtle and difficult doctrine, but not inconceivable and I believe probably true.[1] It does not belong to the thought of modern science, but it is far nearer to it than much which passes for orthodox but is really merely uneducated. Nevertheless, though the formulation of the Doctrine of the Trinity is unintelligible except to those trained in history and philosophy, and belongs to the past, not the future, it is an attempt to state and solve the central problem of the nature of God, while modern preachers, Fundamentalists no less than the rest, seem content to ignore it. The Experimentalist is oftener nearer to believing in the classical doctrine of the Church than his adversaries. He is open to the criticism, often made, that he is replacing orthodox belief by a "Weltanschauung." But the answer to that facile criticism is that in the end no belief in God is—on its intellectual side—anything else than a "Weltanschauung." The Experimentalist merely replaces an "Anschauung" which is no longer generally intelligible, by another which has at least the merit of being stated in the language of the educated world of to-day.

But the Experimentalist does not stop at this point. To define God as Purpose, that is the fixed eternal and immutable Laws of the universe, together with the course and results of the evolution which is pro-

[1] What I doubt of the doctrine of the Trinity is not that God is one or that He is found hypostatically, but that the hypostases are necessarily and eternally three and only three.

duced in obedience to them is theology. It is not religion. It becomes religion when it is accepted not as a theory guaranteed by authority, but as an experiment ratified by practice. For the religion of the Experimentalist is primarily the attempt to serve under the Purpose of Life. It is exactly the same as the religion—not the theology—of many generations of Christianity, who sometimes called it doing the Will of God, and sometimes seeking the Kingdom of God. Moreover, it is exactly the same as the religion—though once more not the theology—of many Fundamentalists. That is why, believing that the Churches are the homes of religion, and knowing that opinion about religion—theology in the looser sense—has always been subject to change, the Experimentalist is not trying to drive out the Fundamentalists from the church, and refuses to go out himself. The controversy between them is serious; it cannot be shortened; it is scarcely possible for human beings to make it anything but bitter; but the Experimentalist has no doubt but that it is a controversy between two bodies of Christians, not between Christians and Infidels.

Furthermore, though some Experimentalists may stop at the recognition of Purpose and the attempt to serve it, most of them would go further because they belong to the long line of those who understand the definition of God given by the Psalmist,—"O, Thou that hearest Prayer."

For in all religion and therefore in all theology,

belief in God is bound up with the question of Prayer.

The problem of Prayer is extremely complex, but it can be put in a preliminary form in a few sentences.

To past generations Prayer meant primarily the process of petition to God by which he was induced to do otherwise than he would have done if prayer had not been used. Fasting and Sacrifice and Prayer were the great magical Triad, by which men endeavoured to secure favour from God.

The Bible and Church History supply countless examples of the importance of this triad. They also illustrate the way in which Fasting and Sacrifice have gradually come to lose their importance.

But Prayer meant also, or rather took with it, the sense of communion with God, not as the Supreme Governor who controls the Universe, but as the Father who advises, comforts, strengthens and forgives his children in answer to their cry of need, who enables them to bear the temptations of success and failure, and lightens their darkness when the clouds hang heavy overhead. The language in which this sense of communion has been expressed has often changed, and will no doubt change again, but the experience which it expresses is permanent.

Moreover, because conversation is the best means of clarifying thought, Prayer has been always the means whereby men have become conscious of their own aspirations, have seen glimpses of a better world,

and have sought henceforward to make the life which they must live on the plain approach more closely to the vision which they have seen on the mount. The vision has always gone with them, and as the inevitable day of weakness has drawn near, when they have known that Mount Pisgah and not the Land of Promise was the farthest that they would reach, it has been to the vision that they have turned to find the true Reality. To errors of intellect and to the weakness of human nature they may have succumbed, for sinners as well as saints, ignorant as well as learned, foolish as well as wise, have been among their number, but they have never wholly forgotten the vision, and those who have come after them have perceived that these were men who were "pilgrims and sojourners" here because they belonged to the city which "hath foundations."

Finally confession or self-examination is a constant element in all the classic examples of prayer. Perhaps it does not necessarily mean the recognition of error, though it often does so, but it is essentially a spiritual "stock-taking," revealing to him who prays what is the true nature of his life, strengthening the good, and condemning the evil in it. For this reason it perhaps plays a smaller part in public prayer than in private. Nevertheless there are certain causes for failure which are common to the race, and can be recognized in common prayer,—the Pride of Life, the Lust of the Eye, and the Desire for Revenge. In spite of a certain exaggeration in its refusal to see

any health in human life few prayers more adequately express the experience of most men than does the General Confession. These causes are the simplest and most powerful enemies of good, and they are met openly though not always by name, in all the great examples of prayer. It is impossible to pray "Thy Kingdom come" and at the same moment be infected by the Pride of Life or the Lust of the Eye; or to say "Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us," and lightly to harbour schemes of revenge. To pray thus, making confession and seeking amendment, will remain the refuge of sinful humanity long after it has abandoned all belief in the magical power of petition to the Almighty.

Thus Prayer means Petition, Communion, Aspiration and Confession. In the public worship of the churches Petition has always been put in the first place, and naturally so, for it is historically the most prominent. Nevertheless probably few educated men believe in its efficacy. The laws of life—which is the Will of God—are not changed in their working by Prayer, Sacrifice or Fasting.

The most striking example of this fact is the crudest and simplest. In my boyhood it was still customary to pray for fine weather, or, on the rarer occasion when the English climate demanded it, for rain. The custom is now, I fancy, almost dead. It has not been killed by any atrophy of religion, but by increased knowledge of meteorology. If you teach

the public every week day in the newspaper that the weather is fixed through complicated laws, that if the barometer is rising fair weather is probable, while rain may be expected if it is falling, you cannot expect them to believe on Sunday that the humidity of the atmosphere will be affected by prayer.

Nor is the question very different with regard to prayer in time of sickness, though the issue is often obscured by pious people who cling to the custom, and do not analyze their belief. Opinion probably ranges itself on this subject into three groups.

There are those who still think that Prayer will cure disease: the belief of innumerable generations supports them, but not the evidence of medical experts. Secondly, there are those who, frankly admitting that Prayer cannot change the course of disease, advocate it as a consolation to the sufferer and to his friends. This is no doubt often true: it is a sound and charitable reason for praying, but it is likely to lose its efficacy when its motive is perceived. Finally there are those who think that in some mysterious way they can by prayer divert a stream of energy to a sick person, and so make him better. Conceivably this is true, though personally I doubt it. But why should this stream of energy be most effectual when put into the form of petition to God? It seems to me that if there be any truth in this theory it is not so much that prayer diverts a stream of healing energy as that it serves as a "suggestion," focussing all powers of resistance and recupera-

tion which the sick may possess, but be unable to "will" to use. That this may be valuable, and should be practised and studied, I do not doubt; but is it Prayer? In any case it is not the same thing as the strictly supplicating prayer of our ancestors, which was a petition to God, who might be persuaded to do what he might otherwise not have done.

My own attention was once called somewhat painfully to the unconscious change of thought which has affected almost everyone in this matter. I was taking charge of a church for a friend who was going away for a fortnight. "You will have," he said, "nothing much to do. But poor Mr. Smith is very ill, and Dr. Brown has promised to let you know if it becomes hopeless, so that you can put him into the prayers." I was very young at the time, and it was somewhat of a shock to me to realize that "praying for" someone in the church, by the customary device of dropping to a lower note the voice which had hitherto monotoned the service on G, and announcing that "The prayers of the congregation are desired for M, who is seriously ill," had become a means of preparing friends for bad news, under the pretence of asking the Almighty for help. The shock to young minds, when they discover such changes as this, alienates more of them from the churches than any direct attack could ever do. The tragedy is that the churches do not know it, for the young do not say much about it; they merely cease going to church. The death of churches is not likely to be violent or

spectacular, for controversy implies life. The deadly sequence of symptoms is when one generation goes to church, supports it financially, and prevents all change in the customs of the forefathers; the second generation continues the support, but leaves it alone; the third generation abandons it altogether.

That the Religion of to-morrow will have Prayer I do not doubt, unless the Churches should be so foolish as to insist that Prayer must include Petition, in which case they will keep the word, and another name will be given to the reality. For I do not believe that the religion of to-morrow will have any more place for Petition than it will have for any other form of magic. But how are the churches going to deal with the question? It is a matter which especially affects the non-liturgical churches, strange as it may seem. In a liturgical church the prayers are frequently unintelligible to the congregation. In the Catholic church they are in Latin, in the English church and Protestant Episcopal Church of America they are in an archaic idiom which diverts attention from its meaning by the beauty of its sound. Converts and strangers may criticise their doctrine, but we, who neglect it, because we have been born in the Church, perhaps do more justice to their significance. Members of non-liturgical churches seem rarely to understand that it is the dramatic, not the theological, side of the service which makes itself felt, that many members of the congregation are purified and inspired by the service as a whole,

without ever stopping to think about its meaning. In any case prayers which were written five hundred or fifteen hundred years ago cease to be regarded as petitions in the same way as those which at least purport to be the fervent supplication of a minister for the special needs of a particular congregation.

Obviously the non-liturgical Protestant churches are in a very different position. Every Sunday the minister is responsible for the "long prayer," as it is usually called. He is supposed to make it apply to the needs of his congregation, it is—at least in form—an extempore performance marked by fervour and unction. If it be not sincere the salt has lost its savour. It is traditionally always in the idiom of petition, but it is significant how many liberal ministers endeavour to quiet their conscience, which dislikes that idiom, by passing—if I may somewhat abuse the grammarian's language—through the "optative mood" to an "oratio obliqua," intended to express the aspirations of the congregation. I cannot resist the conviction that this can be but a temporary expedient, and I believe that this question of Petition in prayer is the most difficult problem which the non-liturgical churches have to face. It will be to them to-morrow what the question of the creeds has been to the liturgical churches.

To see this is not difficult, but merely to abandon the custom of prayer because we no longer believe in the efficacy of petition would be to throw away the grain in an effort to be rid of the chaff.

Prayer, it was said above, is not only petition, but also communion and aspiration. What will the religion of to-morrow say about communion and aspiration ?

If the religious life of the future contains " public worship " as an integral part of its manifestation, it will be because many men feel that not in solitude but in the company of others who have a like necessity do they most feel the communion with a higher power, and can best cleanse their souls from impurities and littlenesses, and light the flame of aspiration, which illumines their path through the darkness of daily life. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly clear that to stimulate and quicken Communion and Aspiration—whatever explanation may be adopted of the experience covered by these words—is likely to be the main purpose of the services of the church of to-morrow, though this will be a serious breach with the tradition of the past, for in the Catholic Church the services are means of salvation, and in the Protestant Church they have been hitherto largely, if not chiefly, means of instruction. Nevertheless, Protestants of the Liberal wing have to a considerable extent accepted the change indicated. The services of the church are held to have a " spiritual " rather than an intellectual value, which seems to mean subjective rather than objective. Catholics, while of course asserting the spiritual value of the service, would maintain that this value is objective—it is in the service not in the frame of

mind of the congregation. Nevertheless the paradoxical truth is that the Catholic service is more successful than the Protestant in giving the subjective value. The Catholic goes to Mass, believing in the objective supernatural value of the service, and for him it does not depend at all on the presence of a congregation to be "valid," for he accepts what to the historian is a myth connected with the sacrament. He gains spiritual help. Moreover others, not Catholic, often feel the value of the service. The Protestant goes to his service, believing in the subjective value of the service, and that its importance is entirely in the effect which it has on the congregation. He hopes somehow that the sermon of the minister, supported by some slight musical introduction, and a few hymns, will do him good. He is often disappointed, he goes infrequently, and his children are ceasing to go at all. The danger to the Catholic church is that it will fail to satisfy the intellect, which will reject the myth of the Mass; to the Protestant that it will not satisfy the soul which the service fails to nourish. The religion of to morrow will doubtless devise a method which will satisfy both intellect and soul. If neither Catholics nor Protestants can mend their ways both will perish, but Religion will survive.

Just as to stimulate and develop the sense of communion and aspiration is the work of the Churches, so to analyse and explain it is the task of the psychologists, and it is not certain as yet what their answer will be. The problem is this: granted that there is

a consciousness of communion which appears to be with some external power, is that appearance correct, or is the communion really with some part of the man's own nature which is ordinarily submerged? Only the professional psychologist is really competent to discuss this question properly, but any one can see that it is not an idle one, and that any answer gives rise to other questions.

It is common experience that whereas our words and actions are usually the result of conscious rational thoughts, there are moments when we are—so it seems both to ourselves and to others—in the clutch of a power beyond our own, sometimes inspiring us to good, sometimes to evil deeds and words. God and the Devil are the explanation which theologians have given to this duplex phenomenon.

But the psychology of to-day has questioned this explanation. It seems to many who have most deeply studied the question that our conscious life of reason has a deep penumbra of which we are not habitually conscious. It makes itself felt only when emotion or some other cause calls it up into action. It contains all the instincts, ethics and thoughts of the past generations, whose history is latent in every individual. If this side of it be called into action by some momentary collapse of our usual psychical balance any one of us may relapse for a time into the condition of primitive man, with primary instincts and animistic thoughts. But some at least would maintain that it contains also the germ of all the achieve-

ments and triumphs which will make life better and fuller for our descendants. If by the splendour of art or the inspiration of religion this side of us be roused into life, we become capable of rising for the moment to heights which only our remote descendants will fully master, and we become living prophecies of a world that is not yet. For the Devil is the ghost of primitive man, and God is the unborn life of the world that is to be.

I can lay no claim to expert knowledge of psychology, but such seem to me to be the main elements of the theory which some psychologists are reaching. To the Fundamentalist it is anathema. He starts with a fixed theology, and that theology is quite as irreconcilable with modern psychology as it is with modern astronomy, geology or biology. But to the Experimentalist there is not the same difficulty. To him it seems that Religion—the experiment he has made himself—is not invalidated and may even be illuminated by the parallel experiments of the psychologist's theory. Religion—and especially that element in it which we call Prayer—is one of the means by which we can best lay the rebellious ghost of primitive man, fighting for reincarnation in us, and gain strength to bring forth the heir of the ages, struggling for birth into the world of to-morrow. "Communion" and "Aspiration" may not imply any external anthropomorphic being but only our own "penumbra" of consciousness of which we normally know so little that we regard it as distinct

from ourselves; yet their value to us remains, and the Institutionalist can give to the upper and the lower parts of the penumbra the names of God and Devil with more propriety than he often achieves in dealing with traditional terminology.

Such seems to me the main outline of the way in which the historic formulation of belief in God is being gradually replaced by another. The justification for the claim that those who are making this change may remain in the Christian Churches is that it is the legitimate evolution of our religion under the influence of modern thought and modern discovery as to the true nature of the universe. The Experimentalist and Fundamentalist agree that it is a real change; but the Experimentalist believes that it is theology, not religion, which he is trying to change. The Institutionalist, while holding much the same position as the Experimentalist, thinks that he can take over the old language and so justify the claim that his theology is the same as the old. The Experimentalist, while seeing the momentary advantage of this position, believes that it is unwise, and tries to use modern language to explain his position.

VII

JESUS

THE two theological questions which most trouble the churches are the Doctrine of God and the Problem of Jesus. Of these the Problem of Jesus is far simpler than that of the Doctrine of God, though—partly because it can be stated more easily—it has raised far more controversy, and is oftener regarded as the touchstone of orthodoxy.

The position is this. The view of the Catholic Church, which is also that of orthodox Protestants, rests on two propositions :—

(1) God has a " Son " or " Logos " or " Word," who is a definite person, distinct from the Father, but not another God.

(2) This son became human in Jesus.

The evidence for both these propositions is the clear statement of the Gospel of John. But they are not supported by the Synoptic Gospels. Dean Inge's essay *Defensio Fidei* is the ablest recent attempt to face this question. He begins by saying that the Synoptic gospels have an " Apotheosis Christology," not a doctrine of an Incarnation, that is to say they represent Jesus as a man who became divine, not as

God who became human. He might have added that neither is the "Incarnation" Christology supported by Jesus himself, who never claimed to be Divine at all, and that the problem is whether we are to accept the view of Jesus announced by himself, or that of the Synoptic gospels, or that of the Fourth Gospel.

Speaking loosely the Dean is right, but the matter is more complex, as he would doubtless have explained had he been writing in greater detail on the subject; for it may be argued that Mark knows nothing even of an apotheosis, and only shows that Jesus was believed to have become a "Son of God," possibly at the Baptism, and that the disciples (and perhaps Jesus himself) believed that he was the "Son of Man" (which only means "Man"), who would come from heaven at the last day to judge the living and the dead. This is "Adoptionism," but it is not necessarily apotheosis, for it is historically unsound to identify with God a "Son of God" (which may mean in Jewish language an angel, or a king, or a righteous man); and whatever the "Son of Man," means, it certainly is not God and cannot ever have meant this to Jewish ears.[1]

In Luke, and probably also in Matthew, the matter is a little different. "Son of God" is in Luke definitely explained as meaning conceived of the Holy Spirit and born of the Virgin Mary. "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the

[1] For a full discussion of this subject, and a justification of the statements made above, see *Beginnings of Christianity*, vol. i, pp. 368 ff.

Highest shall overshadow thee: therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God," says Luke i. 35. Even this is not necessarily "apotheosis" to Jewish ears, though it would imply it to Greek ones.

Thus the question with regard to the Synoptic Gospels and Acts is really dependent on whether we consider that the writers were Jews or Gentiles. If they were Jews, there is no "apotheosis" probable: if they were Greeks, Luke almost certainly and possibly even Mark meant that Jesus became divine, either at his birth, or his baptism, or his resurrection. But undoubtedly these books are "Adoptionist," and show no trace of a "Logos Christology."

In any case therefore the Dean is right in his statement that the Synoptic Gospels do not teach the Incarnation. This doctrine depends on John. It might conceivably have been deduced from the Pauline epistles, though I doubt it, and I am not convinced that John is merely the logical outgrowth of the Pauline epistles. I rather think that Paul and John represent two parallel currents in early Christian thought. But this is a minor point, and undoubtedly the Prologue of John teaches quite plainly that Jesus is the incarnate Logos.

To past generations it was natural to accept this evidence as satisfactory because none doubted that the Fourth Gospel was written by John the son of Zebedee, and represented the actual teaching of Jesus. But the situation was quite changed when even such

moderate and cautious critics as Dr. Sanday began to admit that the Fourth Gospel does not represent historical fact, and had better be left out in any attempt to reconstruct the Jesus of history, for there is no evidence at all in the other gospels for any such contention as that Jesus is the Logos.

Thus there emerge from the Gospels at least two separate conceptions, that held by the writer of the Prologue of John and that found in the Synoptic Gospels. The opinion of scholars such as Dr. Sanday is that the Synoptic Gospels are much nearer the actual life of Jesus than is the Gospel of John. Scholars have long known this, but it has been concealed from the general public by the use of the ambiguities of language so as to state the results while evading the implications of critical study.

In plain language, however, this study shows that the central doctrine of Catholic theology was unknown to Jesus and to those disciples of Jesus who first recorded his life. Even Bishop Gore, though he attaches a higher value to the Fourth Gospel than most students of the New Testament, concedes that Jesus did not teach that he was God incarnate. "We can conceive nothing further from the method of Jesus than that he should have startled and shocked their consciences by proclaiming Himself as God." Thus it is admitted that Jesus did *not* say that he was the Logos, or was God. The Bishop continues, "He had done something which in the long run would make any other estimate of him impossible." This

is far more doubtful. Did the disciples who had known Jesus ever make that estimate? Jesus, confessedly did not say that he was the Logos. The Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke say nothing about it.

They hold at the most—*teste* Dean Inge[1]—a doctrine of an apotheosis, which is incompatible with a Logos Christology. That Jesus was the Logos was discovered by the writer of the Prologue of John, so that once more we come down to the critical question of the Fourth Gospel; for if that be not the work of John the son of Zebedee there is no evidence that any of the Disciples who knew Jesus ever did make this estimate of him. It was those who had *not* known him, and had *not* heard his teaching who adopted this belief.

Dean Inge takes much the same position as Bishop Gore. He does not think that Jesus taught that he was the Logos; I do not suppose that he thinks that Jesus was himself acquainted even with the doctrine concerning it. Nevertheless he states in *Confessio Fidei* (page 46) that "The Incarnation and the Cross are the central doctrines of Christianity." That is to say he thinks that the central doctrine of Christianity can be something which was not included in the teaching of Jesus. That it was not included is now obviously regarded as true by the great majority of those who have studied the New Testament for

[1] I am not sure that Bishop Gore would accept this statement. If not some of the following remarks obviously do not apply to him.

years and are teaching it in the great universities of Europe and America.

I greatly doubt whether the youth of the next generation will be willing to accept the proposition that "the central doctrine of Christianity" is and always must be something which Jesus did not teach himself. What opinion about Jesus is likely to be right? His own? Or that of his first Disciples? Or that of a generation which only knew him at second hand?

The Dean seems indeed conscious that his position is not altogether secure. On page 51 of *Outspoken Essays* (Second Series) he says:

"I am well aware that there is a school of advanced critics who will accuse me of doing here exactly what I deprecate. I have made the weight of my theological position rest on a certain conviction about the historical Jesus—namely, that He was the Incarnate Word or Logos of God, a perfect revelation of the mind and character of God the Father. This belief, they say, is so improbable that it ought not to be held without overwhelming proofs, which are not forthcoming. They have drawn their own picture of Jesus of Nazareth, on the assumption that He was merely a religious leader in Palestine at the time of Tiberius; and they have asked themselves what kind of persons actually exercised this kind of influence at this time. Being for the most past actuated by a dislike of Liberal Protestantism, which they regard as the religion of the hated Germans, they have

taken a positive pleasure in stripping the figure of Jesus of all the attributes with which the devotion of centuries has invested it, and have left us with a mild specimen of the Mahdi type, an apocalyptic dreamer whose message consisted essentially of predictions about the approaching catastrophic "end of the age," predictions which of course came to nothing. I have dealt at length with the position of this school of theology in my former volume of essays. Its protagonist, Alfred Loisy, has shown himself not only a brilliant controversialist, but a very acute critic; though his last commentary, on the Acts of the Apostles, is disfigured by an extravagant scepticism which refuses to accept any statement as true when a possible motive for lying may be conjectured. This brilliant Frenchman has now completely severed his connection with the Catholic Church; but some of his disciples still claim their right to remain ministers of the Gospel, and two of them, Anglo-Americans and priests of the Episcopal Church, have recently written a history of the Christian origins from this point of view. Like Loisy himself, they speak with scorn of Liberal theology, and wish, apparently, to commend Christianity as a mystery religion of the same type as the Hellenistic cults which were its rivals, and with which the Catholic Church of the third and fourth centuries refused to make any terms whatever.

"If the historical evidence favoured this view, I hope I should not reject it from mere prejudice.

But the whole theory seems to me quite perverse. The Jesus whom they draw is a psychological monster, a person who could never have existed, still less have founded a great religion. The teaching of St. Paul is also distorted beyond recognition by these writers. There is not a trace in his epistles of the superstitious and unethical sacramentalism which they try to find there. St. Paul's personal religion was a Christ-mysticism based on individual experience, and working from within outwards, as genuine Christianity always does, to inspire his devotion to the Church as the body of Christ, and his reverence for the two great sacraments in which the Church realises its corporate unity with its Lord. To suppose that St. Paul, a Jew and a Pharisee, worshipped Christ "the Lord" as the Alexandrians worshipped "our Lord Sarapis" is really absurd. Fortunately, we know more about St. Paul than about any other great man of antiquity except Cicero, and he has left no room to doubt what he meant by "serving the Lord Christ!"

It will be observed that in this passage the Dean contents himself with making statements about books which he does not quote, ascribing to them motives which would be discreditable to any scholar, and condemning them—without argument—as perverse and absurd. I do not think that I am wrong in recognizing Dr. Foakes-Jackson and myself as the "Anglo-Americans" to whom he refers, though I certainly am not a disciple of Loisy, as that scholar

would not be slow to state. Nevertheless I rather welcome this somewhat abusive passage, as an unconscious recognition by Dean Inge that he has a weak case, otherwise he would scarcely have succumbed to the temptation to desert his usual philosophic calm and substitute adjective for argument. I should like to know when I ever suggested that Jesus was "a mild specimen of the Mahdi type," or showed signs of being influenced in my thinking by hatred of Germany. What I did say (on page 287 of *The Beginnings of Christianity*, Vol. 1) is that Jesus in his *public* teaching claimed to be a prophet, inspired by the spirit of God, which is exactly what Dean Inge also believes, and the only difference between us is that I believe—and the Dean does not —that Jesus expected the speedy End of the Age and the Life of the World to Come. This matter is certainly open to discussion; but, after all, the Gospels as they stand are on my side, not on his. And though I have thought and still think that there is more sacramentalism in the Pauline epistles than some Protestants admit,[1] I have never described it as or thought of it as "unethical or superstitious." The Dean's statement is a caricature, not a summary, of what I have said. I regret it partly because it is unpleasant, but even more because there is so much which is difficult and obscure in the history of early Christianity that we shall never make progress unless we endeavour

[1] I note with pleasure that Bishop Gore thinks that I am right on this point; see *The Holy Spirit in the Church*, p. 127.

to represent opposite conclusions with fairness rather than acrimony.

The true alternative to the view of Bishop Gore, that the identification of Jesus with the Logos was an inference made directly from his teaching and personality is to recognize that just as the doctrine of a Messiah was current in Jewish circles, so the doctrine of the Logos was current in Greek ones, and was due to the influence of Greek philosophy. That is no proof that Jesus was not the Logos, but it negatives the statement that Jesus' teaching rendered this view of him inevitable. The substance of the doctrine came from Plato and his successors, not from Jesus, and none of his hearers thought of it. It was only used by those influenced by Greek thought. To accept this, as Dean Inge appears to do, and yet say that it must always be the central point of Christianity is a compromise which can play little part in the religion or the theology of the future. It is an attempt to secure a position of which the foundations have been abandoned.

For the foundations of the Catholic theology have really been abandoned by Dean Inge and his followers. He has abandoned the doctrine of an infallible Revelation in the Bible, he has abandoned the historical accuracy of the Gospel of John, he has abandoned the Christology of the Synoptic Gospels, but he has tried to compensate the weakness of this position by the doctrine that the Incarnation of the Logos implies the "transvaluation of values." This means, I

suppose, that through Christianity we learn to find the highest values in unexpected places, and especially to recognize its contribution to the problem of suffering. "The Divine Life,"[1] says Dean Inge, "under human conditions, was the life that ended on the Cross. And it is worth while to remind ourselves that what is best for us is best also for others. The Church at present suffers as much from the vicarious hedonism of its social ethics as from the self-indulgence and greed of some among its unworthy adherents. . . . The controversy about the Divinity of Christ has in fact been habitually conducted on wrong lines. We assume that we know what the attributes of God are, and we collect them from any sources rather than from the revelation of God in Christ. We maintain that, in spite of His voluntary humiliation, Christ possessed all the attributes of the unlimited Sultan of the universe before whom other creeds are willing to do homage. But surely Christ came to earth to reveal to us, not that He was like God, but that God was like Himself. The question which we ought to ask is, 'Since Christ is God, what may we infer about the nature of God?' I am not assuming that such sayings as 'I and my Father are one' are certainly historical. It is enough that He spoke and acted as one fully possessed by the Spirit of God the Father." This is in part true and beautiful and, speaking generally, I think that the gradual "transvaluation of values" marks every stage of progress in religion.

[1] *Outspoken Essays*, II, p, 48*f*.

Certainly it marked Christianity: but it also marked Judaism. Did not the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah have something to do with it? Moreover, is this transvaluation of values the doctrine of the Incarnation as known to history? Is it not using the old word in a new sense? When did Jesus ever say that he had come to reveal that God was like himself? His message was not that he was like God (which would scarcely have satisfied even an Homoiousian) but that men should try to live in accordance with what they already knew of God. If it is enough that he spoke and acted as one inspired by the Spirit of God, why is this not enough to establish the Divinity of other prophets? They certainly did so speak and act.

In all this Dean Inge seems to have abandoned the historic doctrines of Christianity, and to have put up new ones in their place, some of which are true, some of which are doubtful, some of which are beautiful words covering loose thinking, but none of which ought to bear the ancient name of "the doctrine of the Incarnation."

Similarly in circles less learned than that represented by Dean Inge that doctrine has been forgotten rather than abandoned by ninety-nine out of a hundred professing Christians, even among the clergy, who have long ceased to understand what it means. The clergy know the phrase Logos. They have "heard a rumour thereof with their ears," (as Job said of Destruction and Death), but most of them do not

understand it, and know that they could not give a reasonable explanation of its history or meaning. The laity have for the most part never even heard the phrase. The " Incarnation " to some of them means the Virgin Birth, to others the Divinity of Jesus. These are two propositions which they can grasp. But the Logos-doctrine belongs to a far distant period of philosophy, and it is impossible to feel much warmth either in accepting or rejecting what is not understood. It will be possible, perhaps, for some time longer for scholars like Dean Inge to think that this is the foundation of Christianity, but the day may come when men will admit that they do not believe what they cannot understand, and will yet claim to be Christians.

I can see only two real alternatives. It is possible that a Fundamentalist position as to the Bible will conquer. It will claim—what our ancestors all believed—that the Bible is a revelation from God, or in the language of Article XX, " is God's Word written." In this case it is a direct and infallible source of knowledge, co-ordinate with reason, not subject to its criticism. What the Bible states is true, because the Bible says so ; therefore if the Bible says that Jesus was the Incarnate Logos the matter is settled. Nor is there any doubt that the Bible does say so. Argument would therefore be at an end.

If this happens the Christianity of to-morrow

will be Fundamentalist; it does not follow that it will be the religion of to-morrow.

The other alternative is that the Church of to-morrow will frankly accept the "Experimentalist" position. If so it will not require, as a condition of membership, that we should accept any opinion about Jesus, even his own. It is incredible that any will insist on, though some may retain, an opinion about Jesus which was certainly not preached and probably not held by Jesus himself. But it will certainly study what Jesus thought of himself, and if it appear doubtful will regard with interest the possibilities which critical judgment of the documents may suggest.

What are these possibilities likely to be?

The views about Jesus which, on the authority of the Gospels and Acts may fairly be said to have been held about him by his contemporaries (using the word in a wide sense) are these:

(1) He was a prophet.

(2) He was the Davidic Messiah.

(3) He was the Son of Man who would come at the end of the world to judge the living and the dead.

(4) He was the Lord of a Sacramental cult which conferred Regeneration and Life through its Sacraments.

(5) He was the Incarnate Logos.

Of these possibilities the first three views are Jewish, but the fourth and fifth are Gentile. The first view was certainly held by Jesus himself, and

the fourth and fifth were not. He may have held either the second—though the evidence seems to me against this view—or the third, and though I incline against this view there is much to be said for it. But either the second or the third, or both together may be covered by the word " Messiah."

Whether therefore he claimed to be the Messiah, in either of these senses, or was merely so acclaimed by his disciples, is likely to be disputable, and still more will it be a matter of controversy exactly what Messiah actually meant at precisely that time. But I doubt very much whether any one will think that such questions are important, except for the special student. No one will believe in a " Messiah " in any sense in which the word is valuable, though of course mediatising theologians may continue for a time to explain that Messiah means an inspired leader, or whatever equivocation they prefer; but the facts are against them, and their case has only to be stated clearly to crumble wholly away.

The word is actually a title which the Jews gave to various highly placed persons in order to indicate that they had " divine right," and that this right had been conferred by anointing. It is an adjective which could be applied to any person who had this prerogative, or who was thought to possess it. If Hebrew had been talked in the seventeenth century Charles I might have been called " Messiah," for he claimed divine right. It was applied—at least sometimes—to Jewish kings, to Cyrus the king of Persia,

to the Jewish high priest, in later times especially to an expected king who would restore the fortunes of Israel, and in a certain limited Apocalyptic literature, which affected Christianity more than it did Judaism, to a man—(or son of man, for the phrases are identical in Aramaic[1])—who would be sent from Heaven to judge the quick and the dead.

All these figures to which the title of "anointed" was applied were taken over at various times by Christians and applied to Jesus. To them was also added another to which the Jews never attributed the title of Messiah,—the "suffering servant" of the Psalms and of Isaiah. Discussion of this subject too often strays into acrimonious argument as to the details. To avoid this possibility let me content myself by laying down two statements which no historian will deny: (1) that in every case the reference is to a man, not to a God, and therefore indicates that those who had heard Jesus, and produced the synoptic tradition, did not regard him as God incarnate. (2) All of them, with the possible exception of the "suffering servant," belong to the cycle of Jewish eschatological belief, which is as mythical as the gods of Olympus; though like them it has been and can be used as a medium for expressing high and ennobling truths.

Therefore I think that the religious minds of the future will probably pay the same kind of disinterested

[1] Son of man, as distinct from man, is merely a clumsy Greek translation, which no "Greek-thinking" Jew such as Paul ever used.

attention to this " Messianic " question, as they will to the details of Homeric theology. Specialists will continue to discuss it, sometimes even with warmth, but they will not think that their own religion is affected by it, or that the value of the teaching of Jesus or of the Evangelists depends on this question, any more than the beauty of Homer depends on whether we believe in Zeus.

Similarly, just as Jewish Messianic doctrine, whether applied to Jesus or not, belongs to Semitic eschatological mythology, so the doctrine of Sacraments giving Regeneration and Life belongs to the Greco-Oriental cults. Sacraments have, I believe, their own great value in religion. Myths based on sacraments, or sacraments based on myths, have been the door which has opened the way to Reality. That is true : but they are not the truth of history ; and the historical doctrines concerning them are baseless. History seems clearly to show that the sacramental cults of the beginning of the Christian era were all similar in their general religious and theological character, and Christianity from this point of view was one of them, though it does not follow that it or they were for that generation necessarily " unethical " or " superstitious." It also shows that each sacramental religion had a " myth " or story of its own, and none of these myths seems to be really historical. Far the nearest approach to history is the Christian myth, which, as found in the Mass, tells of the Incarnation and Passion of a divine Son of God, who instituted

the Mass in order that his followers might share in the glory which was his. Behind this there is history in the sense that the founder of Christianity lived and died. But not in the sense that he did so in the manner and for the purpose implied by the Mass.

The second of the two Gentile interpretations—that Jesus is the Incarnate Logos, was the last to be suggested, though it ultimately conquered and absorbed all the other views. It has been discussed already. But it is well to point out that the essential objection to making it central in the Christology of the future, as it has been in that of the past, is exactly the same as the objection to the view that Jesus was the Messiah. It belongs to a general form of thought which is alien to that of the world to-day. It is, indeed, not so alien as a belief in a Messiah, or in Jewish eschatology; so that those who are highly educated in Greek philosophy can still assimilate it. But it is not really part of our world, and for most of those who think that they accept it, it is merely a diluted form of ditheistic[1] mythology.

The statement that Jesus was a prophet is on a different level. Two questions must be considered, but kept separate.

In the first place what are the phenomena which

[1] I say ditheistic rather than tritheistic because I have noticed that among the theologically half-educated there is often some real belief in a Logos or in a Holy Spirit, but rarely in both. One or the other of the divine Hypostases is, as it were, left out in this rather disorganized form of thought. To avoid all possible misunderstanding let me add that of course I do not mean that these last remarks apply to Dean Inge.

make a man into a prophet? The explanation—admittedly imperfect—which appeals most to me is that a prophet is a man who at times feels that he is saying and doing things suggested by a power outside himself, so that he seems to be listening to his own voice, and watching his own actions as though they were some one else's. That is the fundamental fact of prophecy, if we look at it, as Experimentalists must always do, from the end of experience and not of origin.

Secondly, whence comes this gift of prophecy? What is its value? Personally I am content to say that I do not clearly know whence it comes. It seems to the prophet to come from without. Perhaps it does: but the psychologist is well aware that many processes which are really internal to the mind or to the "psyche" seem to be external. The ancients all regarded it as a gift of God: with their view of the universe they could do no other. Nor is it probable that the Experimentalist will lightly reject the explanation. If there be, as was said above, a source of life on which men can draw for strength, comfort, and forgiveness, it may well be that prophecy is a stream issuing from this source. But the Experimentalist, if he really grasp the implications of his position, will emphasize the fact of prophecy rather than any theory of its origin. Even if it should appear on further investigation that it comes from within, not from without, the fact of prophecy will remain unchanged.

Nor will its value, for good or evil, be altered. "Prophets" have been the main source in human history of great advance and of great disaster. The Israelites and the early Christians understood this partially when they distinguished between true and false prophets, for they did not mean that the "false" prophet was not a prophet and only pretended to be one. They meant that he was inspired from the wrong source.

The fact recognized by this distinction is real though the explanation is unsatisfactory. It led to the disregard of prophecy and to the erroneous belief that there are "no prophets more." For its natural result was the remarkable verdict of Deuteronomy that if what a prophet says prove to be true he is a true prophet, while if it prove to be untrue he is not a true prophet.[1] The application of this rule simply means that you cannot tell who is a prophet until it is too late for his hearers to benefit by his teaching. Moreover, judged by this standard, after a sufficient lapse of time, no prophet would be seen to be a true prophet, for none are without error,—a fact recognized, though scarcely expressed, by the phrase, so popular in Oxford thirty years ago, that the horizon of a prophet is that of his own time.

[1] Deut. xviii. 15-22. v. 22, reads as follows: "When a prophet speaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to pass, that is the thing which the Lord hath not spoken, but the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously: thou shalt not be afraid of him." The beauty of the language goes far to conceal the fact that this is merely the platitude baldly stated above.

I do not think that the Experimentalist is likely to accept any clear cut distinction between true and false prophets. All of us are a mixture of true and false. The difference between the ordinary man and the prophet is not that between truth and error, but between energy and inaction. The prophet has always been the fiery spirit who has seen the evil in this world, and enjoyed a glorious vision of an ideal life where goodness, truth and beauty are unveiled. Sometimes he has been a wise man as well as a prophet, and those who have followed him have made the world as it is resemble a little more closely the vision which he saw. Sometimes he has been foolish, and in that case the truth of his vision has not prevented disaster from following his foolishness. The guide to correctness in action is reason, not prophecy; but reason by itself seems to have little or no creative energy as compared with prophecy. It is a critical not a constructive faculty. Hence it is that a society which has no prophets perishes from inanition, while if it has nothing else it dies of convulsions. The condition of health is when prophets supply the energy and the vision, while men of reason direct and control it. The condition is one of a very unstable equilibrium: but that is always true of life. The only stable equilibrium is death.

The Experimentalist will certainly rank Jesus among the great prophets of all history. He will not think that teaching is true because it is that of Jesus, but it will reverence him because his teaching was

in the main true and stands the test of experiment.

In the main true: I doubt whether the religion of to-morrow will be contented to say altogether true, and then deceive itself into accepting its own formula by leaving out or explaining away all which it finds impossible to believe.

The Liberal Christianity of to-day has not always learnt to do this. It does not wish—and quite rightly—to accept the eschatological teaching of Jesus. Dean Inge rejects it, and pours out much scorn on those who believe the Gospels that relate it. But the text of the Gospels are against him, and the Fundamentalists are not likely to allow any one to forget it. Either the Gospels are wrong, or Jesus held eschatological opinions which have been partly falsified by history, and have no part or lot in modern thought.

Nor is it only eschatological teaching that is in question. "Resist not evil," "Love your enemies" are precepts which cannot be obeyed literally, and are as difficult to explain away as any eschatology; they proved especially difficult in time of war, and though many preachers entered into a wild competition with each other in England and America to show that they did not apply to Germans, and in Germany to prove they could not refer to the English, it is doubtful whether the churches really benefited by this interpretation of their Founder's teaching.

In general I think that the Experimentalist while

reverencing the teaching of Jesus will soon give up the theory that all modern problems of conduct can be solved by its simple application. In any sense in which such a theory would be valuable it is simply not true.

It is of course true that Jesus taught principles of conduct which cannot ever be annulled or become antiquated. It is certainly true that " to love your neighbour as yourself, and to do unto all men what you would they should do unto you " is a fundamental principle of conduct. No man and no nation can habitually neglect it without suffering. But to suggest that the complicated problems of modern society can be solved by that, and that alone, is like suggesting that the writings of Euclid will solve all modern engineering problems.

Nor is it even true that none of the moral teaching of Jesus ought to be abandoned. I think he clearly taught that riches ought to be rejected and given to the poor. He not only said so quite definitely to the rich man who asked his advice, but he denied the possibility (apart from the special act of God) that rich men can enter the Kingdom of Heaven. I have not the smallest doubt but that Jesus said this and meant it. I do not believe that he meant it as exceptional teaching. Poverty was his rule of life, yet I do not think it is the right rule of life, or that it is practicable if civilization is to continue.

The religion of to-morrow, like its predecessors, will assuredly have much to say as to conduct; but

it will have to work out its own problems in its own way, not by trying to find a short cut to their solution in the teaching of Jesus or of any one else. For as Schweitzer very truly said[1] "the historical Jesus of whom the criticism of the future, taking as its starting-point the problems which have been recognized and admitted, will draw the portrait . . . will not be a Jesus Christ to whom the religion of the present can ascribe, according to its long-cherished custom, its own thoughts and ideas, as it did with the Jesus of its own making. Nor will He be a figure which can be made by a popular historical treatment so sympathetic and universally intelligible to the multitude. The historical Jesus will be to our time a stranger and an enigma. The study of the Life of Jesus has had a curious history. It set out in quest of the historical Jesus, believing that when it had found Him it could bring Him straight into our time as a Teacher and Saviour. It loosed the bands by which He had been riveted for centuries to the stony rocks of ecclesiastical doctrine, and rejoiced to see life and movement coming into the figure once more, and the historical Jesus advancing, as it seems, to meet it. But He does not stay; He passes by our time and returns to His own." The attempt to use the teaching of Jesus as a final solution of our problems neglects this fact, and is frequently made a cloak for preaching, which, if it did not appear to be based on teaching which all reverence, would be

[1] *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, p. 396 *f*.

universally recognized as inane, ineffective, and uninstructed. When however the teaching of Jesus is allowed to belong to its own century, and is interpreted in that light, it gains in strength and pointedness and it becomes an inspiration and a guide.

The Experimentalist of to-day rejects much which past generations have ascribed to Jesus, he does not even follow all that Jesus taught; but he at least knows what he does, and thinks that the path which he treads and the light which he sees would not be disowned by Jesus.

VIII

THE PROBABLE RESULTS OF THE CLASH OF PARTIES

IT is hard to doubt that the theological controversy described in the previous chapters will ultimately favour the Experimentalist. Indeed, in educated circles this end is already in sight. A time will soon come when it will be very difficult to find an educated man of science, or an historian who really holds the old theology.

This really determines the nature, though it cannot fix the details, of the theology of to-morrow. It will be experimentalist, in the sense that it will be based on observation, not on authority, on the facts of religion, as perceived by the individual, not on biblical or ecclesiastical revelation.

But the class which recognises this, though it is and will be an overwhelming majority of educated men, is not likely to control the churches unless it changes its attitude. It has indeed already largely abandoned the effort to do so. Sometimes it has severed all relations with the churches, sometimes it leaves the control of them to Institutionalists, and is contented to find emotional and spiritual help in beautiful

services, the theology of which it refuses to consider.

Thus it is quite conceivable that the religious world of to-morrow will present a phenomenon which has not been seen since the second century,—official churches with a theology which is tacitly rejected by educated men even when, for other than intellectual reasons, they support ecclesiastical institutions.

It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish the future of the churches from the future of religion.

So far as the churches are concerned, if any one of the three parties wins completely and speedily, it is likely to be the Fundamentalists.

It is abundantly clear that they will have on their side energy, determination, organization, and a clearly intelligible position. It is true that in this case Christianity will become more alien to the best thought of the day than it has been since the second century. Opposed to it would be almost the whole weight of opinion of natural scientists, historians and philosophers. It might be said that though this was also so in the second century, nevertheless, at that time, the Church conquered the world. That is partly true; but then the Church conquered by gradually absorbing all that was good in the thought of philosophers of the day, whereas now the Fundamentalist is rejecting it.

It might be supposed that the triumph of Fundamentalism could not last long, and that it would mean the end of organized Protestant Christianity. That is

doubtless true, but the end might not be very soon. The real analogue to the Fundamentalists of to-day is not the early Church, but the State-religion of the Roman Empire. The religion of heathen Rome had reached the "Fundamentalist" stage by the first century. No educated Romans believed in it, but few said so. The pious lower classes were heathen Fundamentalists, and the pious upper classes were Institutionalists. Between them they kept heathenism in existence for three centuries; though the Christians, the Experimentalists of those days, won in the end.

There are two factors in modern life which might easily prolong for several generations the influence of Fundamentalism, and drive out all Experimentalists from the Protestant Churches.

Education, which, at least in the United States, in the public schools is largely controlled by political agencies, may possibly pass into Fundamentalist hands, and be retarded for generations. This effect on education may easily be brought about by political action, especially in America, even though the majority of the people do not really wish it. It is not difficult for any large group, who have set their hearts on some one thing, to obtain a Legislature almost unanimous in their favour, if they steadfastly refuse to vote for any candidate who is not pledged to their support. They can even bring it about so that it will be scarcely respectable to differ openly from them; though in private it may appear obvious

that a majority is not really on that side. If the votes of an organized Fundamentalist party could ever turn the scale in a close contest, it could almost certainly secure the election of a majority pledged to the prohibition of "unbiblical" teaching in any public school. It would to some degree be poetic justice if this happened, for the rapid growth of Fundamentalism is largely due to the fact that a generation ago Liberals thought it right to exclude the teaching of the Bible from these schools. Had they done the more difficult but wiser thing, and insisted that the Bible should be taught properly, as it is in Universities, there would have been no Fundamentalism to-day.

There is also a more sinister cause which may enormously help Fundamentalism. It may appear to large financial interests that industrial stability can be safeguarded by Fundamentalists who can be trusted to teach "anti-revolutionary" doctrine in politics and economics as well as in theology. This consideration gained much support in Holland for the Calvinist party in the first decades of this century. It is a policy which however successful for a time is likely in the end to produce a real revolution. To suppress discussion is always easier than to promulgate truth, though in the end it is safer to try the more difficult task.

It is conceivable that Fundamentalism will succeed in driving out from the Christian Church all Experimentalists, and that the two factors just mentioned

will prolong its existence for many years. Whether, indeed, this will happen depends very largely on the Institutionalists. At present it would seem that they tend to lean altogether too much to the conservative and reactionary side. Though many Institutionalists pride themselves on being "liberal," their liberality does not extend far towards those who differ from them, especially if they happen to differ by going a little further away from orthodoxy. Recent Church history is full of instances of men who had a reputation for liberality in their youth, but have become rigid disciplinarians as soon as they obtained office, and now defend their own peculiar brand of opinion with as much fervour as any Fundamentalist. Such men show that they never really knew what Liberalism is. It is not a series of relatively unorthodox opinions, but a receptive and tolerant frame of mind towards all opinions which can be logically defended. Moreover, when Experimentalists are attacked by the Fundamentalist element in their own church, they have as a rule little help from Institutionalists, who seem to have studied deeply the story of Jonah, and hasten to throw overboard those who are attacked, or at least to leave them undefended on the ground that they have been irritating in their manner, or insufficiently "spiritual" in their speech, or are wrong on some minor detail. They do not side with the Fundamentalists, but they are careful to abstain from any overt act of support to an Experimentalist. One by

one Experimentalists are picked off by individual attacks, and the moral of the situation is not lost on younger men.

But if this continues, the Institutionalists are not likely to last very much longer than the Experimentalists. The Church will, as it were, shrink from left to right.

Nevertheless, though the reign of Fundamentalism might be prolonged, the end would be certain; for that the new world will have a religion of its own no one who is constantly brought into contact with the rising generation can doubt for a moment. The youth of to-day are more, not less, religious than they were thirty years ago. But they do not seem to me to be at all ecclesiastical, and if there is no check to the present tendency to make the churches intolerable for those who wish to think clearly, it may be a long time before the true religion of to-morrow develops into a real church. That it will do so ultimately I do not doubt. Ultimately the forces of the intellect and the spirit would once more come together, and a fresh religion would arise. It would not be called Christian at all, nor would its members wish to be so called, any more than in Holland—where this progress can be watched even now—most educated people would care to be called "Christelijk," which has come to mean "Fundamentalist." [1] But

[1] In Holland, however, language has developed very curiously. The "Moderne" are still members of the Dutch Reformed, Remonstrant and Doopsgezinde Churches, and would certainly call themselves Christians. It is only—as yet—the adjective "Christian" which

it would represent all that was best in educated Christianity. Between it and the great thinkers, scholars, and saints of the past there would be a real continuity of life, but not of institutions, just as there was between Plato and Augustine.

That this society will be called a church is doubtful; it is also unimportant. The word church originally implied some divine supernatural society. Protestant and Catholic disputed about the details of the doctrine involved, or the practices followed, but they agreed that in some real sense the Church was founded by God and not by man. It is very doubtful whether any society of educated men will ever again make or accept any such claim, and they may, therefore, prefer not to use a word which by historical usage as well as by etymology has this connotation. Nevertheless their society will be more truly religious than many societies now called churches, which are merely the large audiences of interesting speakers.

What will be the characteristic expressions of religion which will be sought and found in it? Doubtless it will have a theology, but I do not think it will ever have anything even remotely resembling a creed. Men who have had the same experience will tend to think about it and to formulate it into words, but they will not expect each other fully to agree as to the best formulation, nor will they make acceptance of a formula a condition of membership.

they would refuse to accept. The substantive "Christianity" is rarely heard.

For some time, indeed, I doubt whether there will be a self-conscious organised society at all.

Men and women will consciously and willingly use music, pictures, drama and lectures to stimulate their power of seeing visions, and of opening doors to the "other reality." They will commune with God, and put into practice in their lives what they have thus discovered. But will they have any separate organization for helping them to do this? Will they not rather encourage artists who can make wonderful music to do so freely and for the sake of the music, and refuse to think that a mixture of poor music and inferior lecturing has a religious significance which neither has by itself? Even now I think that many men and women who go to Symphony Concerts in our great cities know quite well that their religious life is stimulated by the music. Will they at once ask for more? Or will not each man go where he finds what he needs, without trying to combine into one society the organization of the various factors which satisfy his religious sense?

I can imagine that if this should happen, a man might go one day to hear a concert, another to see a drama, and on a third to hear a lecture, and from them all he would gain more religion than he does now by going to a church. If so, there might be a period in the history of religion with no churches, no ministers, no denominational philanthropy, no organized sacraments, and yet with more true religion, with larger congregations to hear anyone who has

anything worth saying, with more men truly ministering to the needs of humanity, with more efficiency and yet more kindness in philanthropy, and with many more who have learned to find that the happenings of life, even those which pain and mar and divide, are the true sacraments, the outward and visible sign of the unity found by those who have discovered the way to unlock the barriers.

Ultimately, no doubt, community of nature would again bring together those who were pre-eminent in religious experience. They would, I think, all be Experimentalists, and they would not greatly care whether anyone thought they were Christians or not. From a new society such as might then arise they would ask for the same help which the Experimentalist is asking for now—a progressive and living philosophy of religion. Would it concern itself also with four other topics which have at various periods been very important in the life of Christianity—Philanthropy, Psychiatry, the Enforcement of Conduct and Education?

To discuss these topics fully would require more specialized knowledge that I possess, but I incline to believe that though religion urges men to practise the care of the needy, the cure of souls, the training of minds, and a higher standard of conduct, no church or religious society will ever again make the practise of these subjects its primary object, nor will ministers—if there be any—regard it as part of their professional duties.

This conclusion is not reached because it is in accord with the previous history of Christianity, but from a consideration of the trend of life, and its tendency to increasing differentiation of professional functions. Study of history, indeed, would at first sight seem rather to point in an opposite direction. The most tantalizing side of an historian's work is that he so often is led to see that the important things are not those which are recorded. For instance, from the Church of the fourth and fifth centuries we have a plethora of documents describing theological controversy carried on with a malice and acrimony which create surprise that Christianity could survive them. The matter would be inexplicable, if we did not possess also a few remnants, broken and corrupt, in the *Didascalia* and cognate documents, of another picture showing the Church as the great philanthropic society of those days, governed in a spirit of charity and wisdom by men who understood better than any of their contemporaries the arts of education and administration.

Something similar may be said of the Church of a more immediate yesterday. It is so easy to record the quarrels of ecclesiastics, and to be angry at their manipulation of theology, in such a way as to overlook the real strength of the Church in its care for the poor and the distressed. I have unfortunately less personal knowledge of the philanthropic side of the Church than of its theology. But I am perfectly sure that at any time during my life the Church of

England has survived because of its work for the needy, and in spite of its theology.

Unless I am much mistaken the same fact can be seen to-day in America as the true reason for the strength of the Catholic Church, and for the relative failure of the Liberal Protestant churches. The Catholic Church has Schools, Hospitals, Baby-clinics, Clubs and all kinds of organizations for philanthropic purposes. It has its great reward, not merely in the actual increase of its members, for this is the least of it, and may be even a doubtful element, but much more in the spiritual strength which is gained by its workers. For religion is found not by studying theology, or by talking about it, but by the exercise of the charitable love of man which is so closely allied to the " unmercenary love of God."

The natural conclusion to draw from this fact would be that the Protestant churches of to-morrow will be more highly organized than to-day for philanthropic work. It may be so: the immediate future in cities may see a further development of the " institutional " church, with schools and hospitals and charities under its control. Yet there is another possibility. It may be that the man of to-morrow will prefer to place his philanthropic work on a separate basis. The inspiration would come from religion, but the control would not be under the church. A whole community might well agree to work together for these purposes while going different roads in the matter of church organization. Each

individual would gain in moral strength from his philanthropic work, but his philanthropy would be administered through professionally trained social servants, not through theologically trained ministers. I can imagine that the men of to-morrow may think it quite irrational to employ the same person to expound theology or conduct religious services and to administer charity, or to inquire into " deserving " cases.

It is, of course, impossible to see the future clearly, but it is possible to recognize the factors which will decide it. The weak spot of much denominational charity is that the workers think more of the denomination than of the charity, and sacrifice efficiency to the opportunity of preaching their special gospel, and are often ignorant of scientific sociology. The weak spot of undenominational and " civic " charity is that the workers think more of the organization than of the charity, and treat those whom they are trying to help as " cases," instead of as human beings. Both seem sometimes to need a lesson from the story of Tammany Hall. In some circles Tammany is known only as a by-word for political corruption, and its success is regarded sadly by those who see nothing but its political methods. But Tammany has succeeded, not because it has been corrupt, but because it has had workers with an instinct for human nature, and with a real desire to be kind.

The organization which first learns this lesson is likely to survive, and I can see no intrinsically over-

whelming reason why the church of to-morrow should not learn this lesson as soon as non-religious societies. But nevertheless I slightly incline to the belief that the future will see a general handing over of the control of philanthropic work to some association of charitable societies, which churches will perhaps support, but certainly not control. In their service will be many professionally trained workers who will have studied the technical problems of social failure and will approach their work with an understanding of the needs of society, as well as of individual sufferers.

My chief reason for thinking this is a growing consciousness that much philanthropy has been and is biologically quite perversely unsound. The elimination of the weaker—that is of those who cannot rise superior to circumstances—is the way fixed by the laws of nature for the improvement of the race. If you make the circumstances easier, more will survive, but they will be weaker and less desirable. This has often been done by philanthropists, and common sense demands that the practice must cease. On the other hand, the elimination of the weaker by the unrestrained operation of natural law is a hideously cruel process; common charity demands that it be mitigated. To reconcile the claims of common sense and common charity is the problem which faces the philanthropy of to-morrow. In other words, we desire the elimination of the weaker to continue, but under conditions which will artificially reduce the pain of the process. This is very difficult; and in the

past philanthropy has often succeeded in preventing the elimination without reducing the pain, which is relatively easy. To do the difficult thing will call for professional men and women by whom the social structure and the proper method of conducting repairs in it will be studied and practised with the same care and enthusiasm that is shown by an engineer in dealing with material structure.

Can a church do this? Ought it to do so? I do not know, but I have considerable doubt both whether those who intend to do this work will accept the control of a church, and also whether the churches will be ready to let them work unhampered by theological or ecclesiastical requirements. When a man wishes to practise the profession of social service he will not be willing as a condition to give his signature to obscure metaphysical propositions, if any other path be open. Thirty years ago there was no other path, but to-day there are many others, and the number is increasing.

A parallel situation arises with regard to psychiatry. In the past, as we said above, the priests of the Catholic Church were the psychiatrist, and they were so not only by virtue of their claim to magical power, but because they really knew more about the psyche than any others of their day. Now, however, in the Protestant churches the clergy make—with few exceptions—no magical claim, and—with still fewer—have no pre-eminent knowledge. Meanwhile doctors of a new type have arisen who have studied this

subject deeply and intelligently. It is now recognized that mental disease is a different thing from brain disease, and must be treated differently. The growing conviction of experts is that insanity is sometimes due to physical lesions of the brain, sometimes to "mental" or "psychical" trouble, for which no physical cause exists. The patient is physically quite sound. What exactly is the mind? No one knows: but there are experts in its treatment, and no layman —in the medical sense—ought to meddle with a diseased mind, any more than he ought to set a broken bone, unless no doctor can be found.

Once more, the whole matter is of such complexity that it can only be trusted to professionals. Is it more likely that they will be attached to the ecclesiastical or to the medical profession? There is no historical reason why it should be one rather than the other, but all the signs of the times point to the medical profession as likely to develop this branch of healing, and one chief reason why this is so is because the churches would not be likely to concede that freedom of opinion which the psychiatrist will surely demand.

If I am right in thinking this, philanthropy and psychiatry will not cease to have a religious basis; but they will not be administered by ecclesiastical officials. And this thing will follow the example of law, which also was once much more closely associated with the Church than it is now.

As to conduct, the religion of to-morrow will

assuredly have much to say, and I think that it will differ from the Christianity of yesterday chiefly because it will deal with social, financial, economic and industrial questions, rather than with personal behaviour. So far as personal behaviour is concerned it will probably allow a larger margin of free choice than in the past. Protestantism, especially, has always tended to foolish rigour. I cannot believe that any religion will to-morrow regard smoking tobacco, drinking wine, and frivolous amusement, such as card playing, as a subject for church regulation. All these things are a benefit to many men, and there is nothing intrinsically right or wrong in them.

One man may find much comfort in tobacco, while another may injure himself by smoking; one may err by playing too much, and another by never playing at all. I doubt whether the men of to-morrow will try to interfere with each other on these points, knowing that the thing which matters is ability to do good work, and that one man can do his best work in one way, another otherwise. Many of the things Puritans condemn are strictly indifferent. The religion of to-morrow will recognize this, it will give good advice to individuals, but not lay down general rules for universal observance.

On the other hand, it may have a sterner standard in business, industry and finance. It may insist more loudly that honesty applies to the spirit of business, not merely to its letter. It may even

demand that men must be as trustworthy in advertisements, business announcements, and journalistic reporting as they are in private affairs. For these are the questions of morals which are the issues of life and death for the future. They are not covered by the teaching of Jesus or of historic Christianity, for neither ever discussed problems which did not exist in their time. Some of the principles which have been laid down by them will play a part in the solution of these problems but probably others will also be needed, certainly the actual solutions will contain new elements, and the religion of to-morrow will have to look for them.

To enter into details on this subject is beyond my power or knowledge, though I am very sure that the religion of to-morrow will be a social religion; but the churches must face the problems of the new social order by education, not by political action. Progress in ethics has been made by two factors, and, so far as history tells us, by two only. The first is education, which primarily means showing men facts and making them see problems, without stopping to ask anything about practice or possibility. The educator is essentially a man who makes men see visions. The higher, the nobler and the more impossible the vision, the better is the education. The second is the establishment of custom and law, which ought not to fix ideals, but the "low level" of conduct, to pass below which is punishable.

These two things are equally necessary but quite

separate, and cannot be undertaken by the same organization. The fact that they are at present often confused leads to blurring the vision, on the one hand, and making legislation ridiculous and ineffective on the other. Those who share in the religion of the future will see visions and teach others to do so, but their societies will not, I think, try to enforce their visions by legislation.

The last sentence implies that the organized religion of to-morrow will take part in education. But this is, I think, true only in a limited sense. To teach in a general way, to make men think, to stimulate and inspire—all this is education in the best sense, and the religious society of the future will surely undertake it. But it is very improbable that it will directly occupy itself with the training of the young. I doubt even whether it will continue for long the pursuit of what we are just beginning to call "Religious Education."

If I see the facts rightly the training of youth has passed through three periods. The first, which lasted till the growth of the Universities in the Middle Ages, undertook to convey the necessary rudimentary information. The second, which began with the Universities, attempted to train the intellect. It did not confine itself to information, but endeavoured to make its pupils think straight. It has been a magnificent success, and to-day educated men have no desire to think crookedly. They make mistakes, doubtless, but their minds, though free, are com-

pletely under their own control so that with them thought is guided by knowledge, not by desire. The third period, which is still only in its infancy, is the conscious effort to do for emotional life what has been done for intellectual life. Emotionally many men of the highest intellectual development are wholly uneducated. They think straight and in accordance with knowledge, but they feel in accordance with desire. To remedy this seems to be the object of many "Religious Educators." I believe that they are trying something worth doing, and I hope they will succeed in finding the right way. So far as I have been able to discover there is in their instruction hardly any theology, for they deal mainly with civic and social virtues. It may be that out of it will arise the organized religious society of the future, but I think it more probable that the whole enterprise will be taken up before long by professional teachers rather than by churches. It will, I think, do for emotional life what has been done for the intellect,—provide the world with an educated class in which neither intellect nor emotion will be suppressed by authority, but both will be controlled by understanding. The need of such a class is certainly great, for the threat to civilization comes from emotional not intellectual failure.

However that may be there are two things which will quite certainly be the functions of the religious society of to-morrow, whether that be a reformed type of Protestantism, or a new organization altogether.

It must cultivate a deeper sense of the " values " in life, and teach men to seek and find truth, beauty, and goodness. The work is needed. Our generation is entering on a new world, in a truer sense than many previous ones. The toil of the world has been halved, and the comfort has been doubled by the control of power, which makes the energy stored up in the earth take the burden off the shoulders of men. A totally new set of moral issues are presented, which none but those engaged in the professional work of the world can solve. But the " values " involved have not changed. Whether the new age will be a gorgeous barbarism or a splendid civilization depends on the perception of values which our children will have. To help them to see the glory of truth, and the splendour of beauty, the eternal and unchanging world of immaterial reality, is the work before us, and it requires an appeal to educated emotion as well as to educated intellect.

The other function which is, I think, essential to any society which is really religious and not merely educational, is to afford a centre towards which mystics may turn. To me this is the heart of the whole matter, and, therefore, I have left it to the last.

The mystic is he who has found " the other way " to reality. The ordinary approach to reality is by our senses and our reason, and the artificial prolongations which we have invented. The microscope and the telescope prolong our power of sight, and the

calculus and logic prolong our range of reasoning. I do not doubt that in this way we approach reality. But it is reality from the side which consists in diversity, not in unity, and it emphasizes at every turn the difference between subject and object. It does this in spite of the fact that it also indicates that every detail of this world of real differences is related to every other. It is as though we are standing in the midst of lines radiating from a common centre but are looking outwards, so that, even though we recognize that the lines are radiating, our most strenuous effort to see only reveals their divergence. If we could only turn round and look towards the centre! But our senses cannot do this. They, at least, cannot face the light.

Well, the mystic claims that he has found "another way," which is not the way of the senses, yet is really his, and his reason can study it just as it studies the evidence of his eyes. It is the experience which makes men feel that at certain moments, which for most are very rare, they have become conscious of the unity of all life. The eternal strife between object and subject is over. That is the experience of workers who lose themselves in their work, of artists who lose themselves in the beauty which they feel, of those in whom friendship has leapt the barriers of self, and of saints the eye of whose soul has been able to endure the vision of the One. It is this experience which is the basis of mysticism. It is not an emotion: it is a different form of conscious-

ness. Amid so much that is vague and doubtful in my own vision of the religion of to-morrow this stands out clearly for me: the religious society of to-morrow will have room for mystics.

THE END

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